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I’m going through exactly this joy with a client right now.

“We need SQL injection rules in the WAF”

“But we don’t have an SQL database”

“But we need to protect against the possibility of partnering with another company that needs to use the same datasets and wants to import them into a SQL database”

In fairness, these people are just trying to do their job too. They get told by NIST (et al) and Cloud service providers that WAF is best practice. So it’s no wonder they’d trust these snake oil salesman over the developers who asking not to do something “security” related.

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If they want to do their job well, how about adding some thinking into the mix, for good measure? Good would also be,if they actually knew what they are talking about, before trying to tell the engineers what to do.
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> If they want to do their job well, how about adding some thinking into the mix, for good measure?

That’s what the conversation I shared is demonstrating ;)

> Good would also be,if they actually knew what they are talking about, before trying to tell the engineers what to do.

Often the people enduring the rules aren’t supposed to be security specialists. Because you’ll have your SMEs (subject matter experts) and your stockholders. The stakeholders will typically be project managers or senior management (for example) who have different skill sets and priorities to the SMEs.

The problem is that when it comes to security, it’s a complicated field where caution is better than lack of caution. So if a particular project does call on following enhanced secret practices, it becomes a ripe field for snake oil salesman.

Or to put it another way: no company would get sued for following security theatre but they are held accountable if there is a breach due to not following security best practices.

So often it doesn’t matter how logical and sensible the counter argument is, it’s automatically a losing argument

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They don't want to do their job well. They want to look like they're doing their job well, to people who don't know how to do the job and whose metrics are completely divorced from actual merit.
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I love that having a web application firewall set to allow EVERYTHING passes the checkbox requirement ...
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(I’m in the anti-WAF camp) That does stand to improve your posture by giving you the ability to quickly apply duct tape to mitigate an active mild denial of service attack. It’s not utterly useless.
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Denial of service prevention and throttling of heavy users is a fine use, searching for a list of certain byte strings inside input fields and denying requests that contain them isn't.
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Doesn't it also add latency to every request?
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So does running McAfee on every POST body but some places really wanna do that regardless. (I at least hope the scanner isn't running in the kernel for this one).
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Yeah, we were asked to do this at my last job by some sort of security review. This one doesn't bother me as much. "Display 'network error' whenever a user uploads a file containing 'SELECT *'" is a bad user experience. "Some files in this repository have been flagged as containing a virus and are not visible in the web interface until allowed by an administrator," is OK with me, though.
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I think the main point is the WAF companies must have lobbied to get that into the checklist

the main point is you need to pay a third party

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You can call your existing reverse proxy a WAF to check this checklist item. (Your point still stands, on the median companies may opt to purchase a WAF for various reasons.)
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Often it is just pushing responsibility.
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sure but how much? 3-10ms is fine for the fast protection when shit hits the fan.
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A large investment bank I worked for blocked every URL that ended in `.go`. Considering I mostly wrote Golang code it was somewhat frustrating.
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