So in the off chance that you get a phishing mail, you generate temporary credentials to take whatever actions it wants, attempt to log in with those credentials, get phished, but they only have access to API for 900s (or whatever you put as the timeout, 900s is just the minimum).
900s won't stop them from running amok, but it caps the amok at 900s.
So if your MFA device for your main account is a FIDO2 device, you either:
1. Don't require MFA to generate temporary credentials. Congrats, your MFA is now basically theater.
2. Do require MFA to generate temporary credentials. Congrats, the only way to generate temporary credentials is to instead use a non-FIDO MFA device on the main account.
Nobody is getting a phishing email, going to the terminal, generating STS credentials, and then feeding those into the phish. The phish is punting them to a fake AWS webpage. Temporary credentials are a mitigation for session token theft, not for phishing.
Require FIDO2-based MFA to log into AWS via Identity Center, then run aws sso login to generate temporary credentials which will be granted only if the user can pass the FIDO2 challenge.
The literal API calls aren't requesting a FIDO2 challenge each time, just like the console doesn't require it for every action. It's session based.
I’m excited to see that Identity Center supports FIDO2 for this use case.