Scanning wildcards for well-known subdomains seems both quite specific and rather costly for unclear benefits.
Sure, when WordPress powers 45% of all websites, your odds to reach something by hitting /wp-admin are high.
The space of all the possible unknown subdomains is way bigger than a few well known paths you can attack.
> You're able to see this because you set up a wildcard DNS entry for the whole ".nothing-special.whatever.example.com" space pointing at a machine you control just in case something leaks. And, well, something did* leak.
They don't need the IP address itself, it sounds like they're not even connecting to the same host.
You now have to argue that a random third party is using and therefore paying sentry.io to do monitoring of random subdomains for the dubious benefit of knowing that the domain exists even though they are paying for something that is way more expensive.
It's far more likely that the NAS vendor integrated sentry.io into the web interface and sentry.io is simply trying to communicate with monitoring endpoints that are part of said integration.
From the perspective of the NAS vendor, the benefits of analytics are obvious. Since there is no central NAS server where all the logs are gathered, they would have to ask users to send the error logs manually which is unreliable. Instead of waiting for users to report errors, the NAS vendor decided to be proactive and send error logs to a central service.