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> The problem is that the vulnerability exploited by salt typhoon is a systemic flaw implemented at the demand of Cantwell and other of our legislative morons.

Assuming you're talking about CALEA, I find it hard to blame Cantwell personally given that she first joined the House in 1993, and CALEA was passed in 1994. She wasn't in much of a position to "demand" anything against the headwinds of a bipartisan bill passed in both chambers by a voice vote.

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The point remains that she's pretending the problem is AT&T, when really it is the US government's demand for a backdoor.

This should be trumpeted as an example of why we cannot mandate encryption backdoors in chat, unless we want everybody to have access to every encrypted message we send.

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You can tell this whole thing will be a nothingburger on the government side because the only thing she can actually do is pull in some CEOs to (not) answer questions and receive a congressional tsk tsk.
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It's not even a strongly worded letter, lol. Senators and congress people should have to wear shock collars, and on majority polling get hourly "feedback" from their constituency, and for senators, weekly national feedback.

The convention of states project seems like it might be the only way out - there's a shot at implementing term limits, clearing up some of the money in politics issues, no risk of a runaway convention, etc, and we can bypass the people deliberately fouling up the system.

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The country is such a dumpster fire. Fucking congressional hearings. The best case scenario is a little video clip that legislators can use to campaign with.

Each election period they have to take a break from eroding citizens' rights catering to lobbyists. The video clips help them pretend they were doing something other than insider trading while in the seat.

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>You cannot have an "only the good guys" backdoor.

So what? If I store a document in a private Google doc. I know that technically a Google employee could read it if they really wanted to, but the policies, security, and culture in place make it have a 0% of happening. It's possible to design proper access systems where random people are not able to come in and utilize that access.

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So you think there's no Google employees with privileged access gooning on private images, stalking, selling access, disrupting individuals, etc?

Schmidt notoriously had a backdoor, and I'd be far more shocked if executives did not have backdoor access and know all the workarounds and conditions in which they have unaccountable, admin visibility into any data they might want to access.

These are human beings, not diligent, intrepid champions of moral clarity with pristine principles.

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Google employees with access? Yes. Google employees without audited and multiple levels of approval? No. I can tell you there are not.

Any Eng at Google can read the entire codebase for gdrive, if there were backdoors it would become public knowledge very quickly.

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> It's possible to design proper access systems where random people are not able to come in and utilize that access.

How quickly "Hacker" News forgets Snowden.

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>I know that technically a Google employee could read it if they really wanted to, but the policies, security, and culture in place make it have a 0% of happening.

We know it's non-zero as they have already had occasions when it has happened that Google employees used their access to stalk teenagers.

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And such access kicked off an internal investigation and got him fired. Privacy is taken seriously.
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This is such a backwards take. You are ignoring that the system you cite as evidence that secure systems with backdoors can be designed and protected from random access has not been perfectly protected.

And you say it's stronger now.

Ok, so which country or neighbor is going to be the one to hack our national encryption system with a back door the first time? The second time? The third time? Before we manage to get it right (which we never will), what damage will be done by the backdoor? Probably something like Salt Typhoon, which you also conveniently ignore as a counterfactual to your claim.

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It not being perfectly protected is by design. Security comes with trade offs.

>Before we manage to get it right (which we never will)

Keep in mind that modern encryption isn't perfect either. You can just guess the key and then decrypt a message. In practice if you make the walls high enough (requiring a ton of guesses) than it can be good enough to keep things secure.

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>And such access kicked off an internal investigation and got him fired. Privacy is taken seriously.

The complaints of the victim's parents kicked off an internal investigation, months later. It's not like google found this and took care of it on their own. Also, it has happened before too.

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Google's internal privacy controls and monitoring are much stronger today than when that happened.
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