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by cyberax4 hours ago |
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upvoteby adrian_b2 hours ago|
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The RC-5 cipher was very nice for its day, but I am certain that it is much slower than AES on any modern CPU, with the exception of microcontrollers, where nonetheless other solutions, e.g. ChaCha20, may be faster.

AES also needs only a handful of lines of code for its implementation (using assembly). For such an application, you can even reduce the number of rounds of AES-128, e.g. from 10 to 4.

When you want truly uniform random numbers, then encrypting with AES-128, then truncating, is best. If you want invertible encryption, then you should encrypt a counter and either use a 32-bit addition or a 32-bit XOR for encrypting the 32-bit number. With a single AES-128 invocation for generating a random mask, you can encrypt four 32-bit numbers.

Of course, when speed does not matter, you can use pretty much any of the historical block ciphers, because the security requirements for encrypting 32-bit numbers are very low, since they are easier to find by brute force searching than by attempting to break any kind of encryption.

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upvoteby cyberax1 hours ago|
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The problem is that AES needs a 128-bit block.

Imagine that you want to obfuscate your order numbers in the database so that customers can't infer the volume of business by checking the order number.

You can use UUIDs, but you also want to keep the numbers short so they can be dictated over the phone. You can use random IDs, but then you need to lock them in the database during the object creation otherwise you might get collisions.

Or perhaps you have a distributed system and want to allocate a bunch of IDs for each node in advance.

RC-5 with its small block size neatly solves this. You can have a strictly increasing database sequence, and then just give out each node a bunch of numbers ("from 100 to 120"), and nodes can then generate IDs based on them. And there can be no collisions with other nodes because symmetric ciphers are obviously bijective.

For these kinds of use-cases performance is not an issue.

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upvoteby tptacek1 hours ago|
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Right, but balanced and unbalanced Feistel networks let you turn the 16-byte AES block into an arbitrarily small PRF.
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upvoteby cyberax59 minutes ago|
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Well, yes. But at this point you're just making a new cipher with AES as the round function. And I think it should be at least as safe as the round function?

I have not checked lately, but is it actually the recommendation for format-preserving encryption?

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upvoteby tptacek50 minutes ago|
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I don't know about "the" recommendation, but it's how NIST standardized it (FF1 and FF3, both Feistel networks) and in the NIST rubric these aren't "new ciphers"; they're "block cipher modes".

I'll say I'm more comfortable using a straightforward FPE block cipher mode with AES than I am repurposing a weaker lightweight cipher to take advantage of its 32-bit block size.

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upvoteby jcalvinowens3 hours ago|
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Funny your example is rc5, I wrote exactly what you describe to generate 32-bit cookies in a random prototype a few years ago: https://github.com/jcalvinowens/sdvr/blob/main/rc5.c

It is cute, but surely there's a more efficient way than RC5? There are bijective hash functions which are much cheaper (murmur, at least).

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upvoteby cyberax1 hours ago|
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In my case, performance was utterly unimportant.

But is Murmur actually bijective?

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upvoteby jcalvinowens1 hours ago|
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Mine too, I was just curious.

I recall empirically determining murmur was bijective across all 32-bit inputs, but I can't find that written down anywhere.

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