The "before it touches disk" thing in the promo copy is silly, yes, but there's really no sane threat model for this; from every vantage point where this could matter, you already have game-over attacks on the app.
replyProtected memory can be used to fix that. Working on a related project that I'm planning to share soon.
replyBut so what? Another app can't really read swap file/partition. Unless it runs with elevated privileges like root, in which case the system is compromised anyway.
replyHey, thanks for the feedback! That's a valid point; currently, my main focus is to secure the store on disk, but this is definitely a point which could be improved later on.
replyIf your machine is fully compromised or actively monitored by a threat actor with physical access, then this tool would not cover you, that's for sure.
If you have any concrete recommendations, I can even give it a try in one of the next releases.
Thanks!
I thought we were all supposed to be encrypting our swap. Or is there something better an app can do about this?
replyWe're all supposed to be encrypting our storage too but this tool advertises that it encrypts your secrets before they hit the disk.
replyAll of the supported operating systems have memory locking functions that prevent swapping out but they are not used in this tool, AFAIK. Also, they are intended to lock things like secret keys that are small and not displayed to the user in a GUI. You can lock the whole process though but a big web browser process is going to significantly up the amount of unswappable memory. Stuff sent to the windowing system may get swapped out too.