undefined

points

[-]

I think they poo-poo it because it tends to produce just-so stories that "explain" known facts while saying nothing about anything beyond them. To an extent, all hypotheses arise from observations (and more specifically, the frisson between observations and theoretical expectations), but you can't just stop there. Grounded theory just feels like empiricism with a soft blur filter.

(This problem is not just limited to social scientists. I think you could, for example, construct a plausible objection to dark matter as an "explanation" that just "saves appearances" on the same basis.)

by selridge9 hours ago|

parent|

[-]

Yeah, I’m aware of those critiques and they are all correct or at least draw blood.

What’s interesting about this paper is the suggestion that perhaps empiricism could do with a soft blur.

One might even invoke KJ Healy’s “Fuck Nuance” here as well.

by PlatoIsADisease7 hours ago|

prev|

[-]

Induction vs Deduction.

Grounded theory is probabilistically correct. Deduction if correct, is actual reality.

Don't get me wrong, I want to love induction, I have William James of Pragmatism on my wall... but the problems with induction hurt me to my core. I know deduction has problems too, but the Platonic Realist in me loves the idea of magic truths.

by selridge2 hours ago|

parent|

[-]

It’s really tough.

I suspect that the 21st-century will continue to show better and more evidence for “mess” being the right cognitive container (or just garbage can à la James March). I don’t think induction will win but deduction will require more epicycles.