> In addition to all that, by the nature of the respective code bases it presents a significantly smaller attack surface than a computer running Qubes OS.

I critisize precisely because I don't understand what you're talking about. The last relevant VM escape was in 2006, discovered by Rutkowska herself. Since then, nothing could access my secrets in an offline vault VM. I would appreciate a clarification, how GrapheneOS can be more secure without reliable virtualization.

AFAIK Xen security relies on 100k LoC. And this is in addition to the virtualization. How many LoC does GrapheneOS require to provide its security? How can it have less attack surface than Xen? Developers replying to me here never provided an understandable reasoning, only keep repeating that it's "very, very secure", without even mentioning any threat model.

Doesn't GrapheneOS rely on closed Google's hardware to provide its security? I would never trust Google with that. How can I not critisize such approach?