1. When you set up your account and it asks for your birthdate, make up any date you want that is at least far enough in the past to indicate an age older that what any site you might use that checks age requires.
2. Access things the way you've always done. All that has changed is that things that care about age checks find out you claim to be old enough.
The only people it actually materially affects on your new computer are people who cannot set up their own accounts, such as children if you have set up permissions so they have to get you to make their accounts.
Then if you want you can enter a birthdate that gives an age that says non-adult, so sites that check age will block them.
From a privacy and anonymity perspective this is essentially equivalent to sites that ask "Are you 18+?" and let you in if you click "yes" and block you if you click "no". It is just doing the asking locally and caching the result.
This puts the responsibility back on parents to do the bare minimum required in moderating their child’s activities.
Possibly it could be further mandated that the OS collect relevant rating information for each account and provide APIs with which browsers and other software could implement filtering.
And possibly it could be further mandated that web browsers adopt support for this filtering standard.
And if you want a really crazy idea you could pass a law mandating that parents configure parental controls on devices of children under (say) 12 and attach civil penalties for repeated failure to do so.
There's never any need for information about the user to be sent off to third parties, nor should we adopt schemes that will inevitably provide ammo for those advocating attested digital platforms.
Sending all the "bad" data to the client and hoping the client does the right thing outs a lot of complexity on the client. A lot easier to know things are working if the bad data doesn't ever get sent to the client - it can't display what it didn't get.
When you click on a search result, you load a new page on a different website. The new page would once again come with a header indicating the content rating. This header would be attached to all pages by law. It would be sent every time you load any page.
Assuming that the actual problem here is the difficulty of implementing reliable content filtering (ala parental controls) then the minimally invasive solution is to institute an open standard that enables any piece of software to easily implement the desired functionality. You can then further pass legislation requiring (for example) that certain classes of website (ex social media) include an indication of this as part of the header.
Concretely, an example header might look like "X-Content-Filter: 13,social-media". If it were legally mandated that all websites send such it would become trivially easy to implement filtering on device since you could simply block any site that failed to send it.
> A lot easier to know things are working if ...
Which is followed by wanting an attested OS (to make sure the value is reliably reported), followed by a process for a third party to verify a government issued ID (since the user might have lied), followed by ...
It's entirely the wrong mentality. It isn't necessary for solving the actual problem, it mandates the leaking of personal data, and it opens an entire can of worms regarding verification of reported fact.
Reading the first analysis PDF:
> This bill, sponsored by the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children and Children Now, seeks to require device and operating systems manufacturers to develop an age assurance signal that will be sent to application developers informing them of the age-bracket of the user who is downloading their application or entering their website. Depending on the age range of the user, a parent or guardian will have to consent prior to the user being allowed access to the platform. The bill presents a potentially elegant solution to a vexing problem underpinning many efforts to protect children online. However, there are several details to be worked out on the bill to ensure technical feasibility and that it strikes the appropriate balance between parental control and the autonomy of children, particularly older teens. The bill is supported by several parents’ organizations, including Parents for School Options, Protect our Kids, and Parents Support for Online Learning. In addition, the TransLatin Coalition and The Source LGBT+ Center are in support. The bill is opposed by Oakland Privacy, TechNet, and Chamber of Progress.
I think you’ve nailed it here. How many of these people campaigned on this issue? Where were the grassroots to push this? Where did this even come from?
Somebody, somewhere - with a heck of a lot of money - wants to see this happen. And I don’t think they have good intentions with it.
TLDR: Evil people be doxxed internally not everyone.
These days the name "LLM" refers more to the architecture & usage patterns than it does to the size of model (though to be fair, even the "tiny" LLMs are huge compared to any models from 10+ years ago, so it's all relative).