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> There's nothing about DoH that makes it complicated to speak it to an authority server.

There’s a problem with HTTPS, though. HTTPS uses URLs that use WebPKI to tie the URL to the certificate validation algorithm. Which means you need WebPKI certificates, which needs DNS. Chicken, meet egg.

Maybe there could be a new URL scheme that doesn’t need WebPKI. It could be spelled like:

    https_explicit:[key material]//host.name/path
or maybe something slightly crazy and even somewhat backwards compatible if the CA/browser people wouldn’t blow a fuse:

    https://1.2.3.4.ipv4.[key material].explicit_key.net
explicit_key.net would be some appropriate reserved domain, and some neutral party (ICANN?) could actually register it, expose the appropriate A records and, using a trusted and name-constrained intermediate CA, issue actual certificates that allow existing browsers to validate the key material in the domain name.
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I think stuff like this is more than promising; I think it's likely to happen relatively soon.
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Which is a problem with the OS and browser, not with DNSSEC.
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Eric Rescorla's post, linked upthread, goes into detail about why "OS's and browsers" can't easily solve this problem without breaking the Internet for materially large fractions of their users. In practice, browsers that care about DNS security just use DoH.
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