This is what keeps me skeptical about ECC. RSA is really chunky, and maybe that's a fundamental advantage from an information theory perspective. Compromising on the crypto scheme because we can't fit inside UDP seems like a cursed path.
So maybe quantum computers should first complete some of these RSA challenges with less compute resources than done classically before considering any claims about qubits needs as practical.
All of this in the context of DNSSEC or other system using signatures. For encryption the story is different.
Of course, this part of the NIST recommendation doesn't matter, because DNSSEC is moribund. If we want post-quantum record authenticity, we should go back to the drawing board and come up with something that doesn't depend on UDP (and that doesn't carry DNSSEC's 1994-vintage offline-signer compromise and all-or-nothing zone signature compromise).
Could use some proofreading.