Not really. I try to capture the most common ones for caching [1], but if I miss it, then it is just inefficient, as it is equivalent to a cache miss.
I'll emphasize again, "no linter/scanner/formatter (e.g., trivy) should need full disk access".
1 - https://github.com/ashishb/amazing-sandbox/blob/fddf04a90408...
Have you solved for publishing? You'll need your token to enter the container or you'll need an authorizing proxy. Are cache volumes shared? In that case, every container is compromised if one is. All of these problems and many more go away if the project is built around them from the start.
It's perfectly nice to wrap things up in docker but there's simply no argument here - developers can write sandboxes for their software more effectively because they can architect around the sandbox, you have to wrap the entire thing generically to support its maximum possible privileges.
Inside the sandbox but not on my machine. Show me how it can access an unmounted directory.
> Have you solved for publishing? You'll need your token to enter the container or you'll need an authorizing proxy.
Amazing-sandbox does not solve for that. The current risk is contamination; if you are running `trivy`, it should not need access to tokens in a different env/directory.
> All of these problems and many more go away if the project is built around them from the start.
Please elaborate on your approach that will all me to run markdown/JS/Python/Go/Rust linters and security scanners. Remember that `trivy` which caused `litellm` compromise is a security scanner itself.
> developers can write sandboxes for their software more effectively because they can architect around the sandbox,
Yeah, let's ask 100+ linter providers to write sandboxes for you. I can't even get maintainers to respond to legitimate & trivial PRs many a time.
So it says right on the tin of my favorite distro: 'Warning: Beware that the docker group membership is effectively equivalent to being root! Consider using rootless mode below.' So # docker run super-evil-oci-container with a bind mount or two and your would-be attacker doesn't need to guess your sudo password.
1. That super evil OCI container still needs to find a vulnerability in Docker
2. You can run Docker in rootless mode e.g. Orbstack runs without rootRootless mode requires unprivileged user namespaces, disabled on almost any distribution because it's a huge security hole in and of itself.