Frontier models are reliably providing high undergraduate to low graduate level customized explanations of highly technical topics at this point. Yet I regularly catch them making errors that a human never would and which betray a fatal lack of any sort of mental model. What are we supposed to make of that?
It's an exceedingly weird situation we find ourselves in. These models can provide useful assistance to literal mathematicians yet simultaneously show clear evidence of lacking some sort of reasoning the details of which I find difficult to articulate. They also can't learn on the job whatsoever. Is that intelligence? Probably. But is it general? I don't think so, at least not in the sense that "AGI" implies to me.
Once humanity runs out of examples that reliably trip them up I'll agree that they're "general" to the same extent that humans are regardless of if we've figured out the secrets behind things such as cohesive world models, self awareness, active learning during operation, and theory of mind.
It's certainly true. By definition. If the bar for general intelligence is being smarter than the median human, 50% of people won't reach the threshold for general intelligence. (And if the bar is beating the median in every cognitive test, then a much smaller fraction of people would qualify.)
People don't have a consistent definition of AGI, and the definitions have changed over the past couple years, but I think most people have settled on it meaning at least as smart as humans in every cognitive area. But that has to be compared to dumb people, not median. We don't want to say that regular people don't have general intelligence.
I have yet to see a "error" that modern frontier models make that I could not imagine a human making - average humans are way more error prone than the kind of person who posts here thinks, because the social sorting effects of intelligence are so strong you almost never actually interact with people more than a half standard deviation away. (The one exception is errors in spatial reasoning with things humans are intimately familiar with - for example, clothing - because LLMs live in literary space, not physics space, and only know about these things secondhand)
> and which betray a fatal lack of any sort of mental model.
This has not been a remotely credible claim for at least the past six months, and it seemed obviously untrue for probably a year before then. They clearly do have a mental model of things, it's just not one that maps cleanly to the model of a human who lives in 3D space. In fact, their model of how humans interact is so good that you forget that you're talking to something that has to infer rather than intuit how the physical world works, and then attribute failures of that model to not having one.
I mostly agree if "a human" is just any person we pluck of the street. What I still see with some regularity is the models (right now, primarily Opus 4.6 through Claude Code) making mistakes that humans:
- working in the same field/area as me (nothing particularly exotic, subfield of CS, not theory)
- with even a fraction of the declarative knowledge about the field as the LLM
- with even a fraction of frontier LLM abilities suggested by their perf in mathematical/informatics Olympiads
would never make. Basically, errors I'd never expect to see from a human coworker (or myself). I don't yet consider myself an expert in my subfield, and I'll almost certainly never be a top expert in it. Often the errors seem to present to me as just "really atrocious intuition." If the LLM ran with some of them they would cause huge problems.
In many regards the models are clearly superhuman already.
I wasn't talking about the average person there but rather those who could also craft the high undergrad to low grad level explanations I referred to.
> This has not been a remotely credible claim for at least the past six months
Well it's happened to me within the past six months (actually within the past month) so I don't know what you want from me. I wasn't claiming that they never exhibit evidence of a mental model (can't prove a negative anyhow). There are cases where they have rendered a detailed explanation to me yet there were issues with it that you simply could not make if you had a working mental model of the subject that matched the level of the explanation provided (IMO obviously). Imagine a toddler spewing a quantum mechanics textbook at you but then uttering something completely absurd that reveals an inherent lack of understanding; not a minor slip up but a fundamental lack of comprehension. Like I said it's really weird and I'm not sure what to make of it nor how to properly articulate the details.
I'm aware it's not a rigorous claim. I have no idea how you'd go about characterizing the phenomenon.
>But is it general? I don't think so
I would consider it as general due to me being able to take any problem I can think of and the AI will make an attempt to solve it. Actually solving it is not a requirement for AGI. Being able to solve it just makes it smarter than an AGI that can't. You can trip up chess AI, but that don't stop them from being AI. So why apply that standard to AGI?
I think stockfish reasonably qualifies as superhuman AI but not even remotely "general". Similarly alphafold.
> Actually solving it is not a requirement for AGI.
I think I see what you're trying to get at but taken as worded that can't possibly be right. Otherwise a dumb-as-a-brick automaton that made an "attempt" to tackle whatever you put in front of it would qualify as AGI.
I would agree as long as there is a general mechanism to represent problems. It is AGI, but would perform poorly on benchmarks compared to better AGI.