https://support.apple.com/en-us/126047

The chances of zero of these CAs having been compromised by state-level actors seems… slim.

Do you trust "Hongkong Post Root CA 3" not to fuck with things?

Your link's from 2011; the US government was still in the trusted list until 2018. https://www.idmanagement.gov/implement/announcements/04_appl...

China telecom regularly has BGP announcements that conflict with level3's ASNs.

Just as a hint in case you want to dig more into the topic, RIR data is publicly available, so you can verify yourself who the offenders are.

Also check out the Geedge leaked source code, which also implements TLS overrides and inspection on a country scale. A lot of countries are customers of Geedge's tech stack, especially in the Middle East.

Just sayin' it's more common than you're willing to acknowledge.

https (specifically the CA chain of trust) is imperfect, and can be compromised by well-placed parties.