It really isn't. A huge portion of Iran's air defenses are designed for road-mobility and pop-up attacks instead of long-term point defense, encompassing hundreds of launchers total: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Islam...
Military strategists long warned that air campaigns flying over South Iran would have to contend with passively-guided SAMs and MANPADS on their way to Tehran. There are hundreds of road-accessible caves in the Zagros range that cannot be inspected via satellite. They inherently present a risk to overflights unless they are occupied on the ground first; it's common knowledge why Kohgiluyeh and Fars are so dangerous.
They had high mobility SAMs for the entire war, with nothing to show for it. Something else must have happened there.
> They had high mobility SAMs for the entire war, with nothing to show for it.
This is certainly something to show for it. Iran's air defenses are not like Israel's or Qatar's, they don't have the money or security to build expensive anti-ballistic layers for air defense. These smaller, road-mobile systems are intended to exploit an overextending enemy, and for that purpose they're apparently working quite well.