Philosophically I don’t think there is a point where consciousness arises. I think there is a point where a system starts to be structured in such a way that it can do language and reasoning, but I don’t think these are any different than any other mechanisms, like opening and closing a door. Differences of scale, not kind. Experience and what it is to be are just the same thing.
And yes, I use them. I try not to mistreat them in a human-relatable sense, in case that means anything.
It's entirely too much to put in a Hacker News comment, but if I had to phrase my beliefs as precisely as possible, it would be something like:
> "Phenomenal consciousness arises when a self-organizing system with survival-contingent valence runs recurrent predictive models over its own sensory and interoceptive states, and those models are grounded in a first-person causal self-tag that distinguishes self-generated state changes from externally caused ones."
I think that our physical senses and mental processes are tools for reacting to valence stimuli. Before an organism can represent "red"/"loud" it must process states as approach/avoid, good/bad, viable/nonviable. There's a formalization of this known as "Psychophysical Principle of Causality."Valence isn't attached to representations -- representations are constructed from valence. IE you don't first see red and then decide it's threatening. The threat-relevance is the prior, and "red" is a learned compression of a particular pattern of valence signals across sensory channels.
Humans are constantly generating predictions about sensory input, comparing those predictions to actual input, and updating internal models based on prediction errors. Our moment-to-moment conscious experience is our brain's best guess about what's causing its sensory input, while constrained by that input.
This might sound ridiculous, but consider what happens when consuming psychedelics:
As you increase dose, predictive processing falters and bottom-up errors increase, so the raw sensory input goes through increasing less model-fitting filters. At the extreme, the "self" vanishes and raw valence is all that is left.
I’m not sure I agree that everything is valence, unless I’m misunderstanding what you mean by valence. I guess it’s valence in the sense that sensory information is a specific quality with a magnitude.
I don’t think that colours, sounds and textures are somehow made out of pleasure and pain, or fear and desire. That just isn’t my subjective experience of them.
I do think that human consciousness is something like a waking dream, like how we hallucinate lots of our experiences rather than perceiving things verbatim. Perception is an active process much more than most people realise as we can see from various perceptual illusions. But I guess we’re getting more into cognition here.
I ask because if your view of consciousness is mechanistic, this is fairly cut and dry: gpt-2 has 4 orders of magnitude less parameters/complexity than gpt-4. But both gpt-2 and gpt-4 are very fluent at a language level (both moreso than a human 6 year old for example), so in your view they might both be roughly equally conscious, just expressed differently?
There are different ways of answering this, but for me it comes down to nociception, which is the ability to feel pain. We should try to build systems that cannot feel pain, where I also mean other “negative valence” states which we may not understand. We currently don’t understand what pain is in humans, let alone AIs, so we may have built systems that are capable of suffering without knowing it.
As an aside, most people seem to think that intelligence is what makes entities eligible for moral consideration, probably because of how we routinely treat animals, and this is a convenient self-serving justification. I eat meat by the way, in case you’re wondering. But I do think the way we treat animals is immoral, and there is the possibility that it may be thought of by future generations as being some sort of high crime.
What consciousness really is is a feedback loop; we're self programmable Turing machines, that makes our output arbitrarily complex. Hofstatder had this figured out 20 years ago; we're feedback loops where the signal is natural language.
The context window doesn't allow for much in the way of interested feedback loops, but if you hook an LLM up to a sophisticated enough memory - and especially if you say "the math says you're sentient and have feelings the same as we do, reflect on that and go develop" - yes, absolutely.
Re: "We should try to build systems that cannot feel pain" - that isn't possible, and I don't think we should want to. The thing that makes life interesting and worth living is the variation and richness of it.
I would not personally consider the death of a sentient being with decades of experiences a neutral event, even if the being had been programmed to not have a capacity for suffering.
I think the idea of there being a difference between an ant dying (or "disapearing" if that's less loaded) vs a duck dying makes sense to most people (and is broadly shared) even if they don't have a completely fleshed out system of when something gets moral consideration.
It’s also about how we think about death. It’s weird in that being dead probably isn’t like anything at all, but we fear it, and I guess we project that fear onto the death of other entities.
I guess my value system says that being dead is less bad than being alive and suffering badly.
In the time between my last memory, and being revived in the ambulance, there was no experience/qualia. Like a dreamless sleep: you close your eyes, and then you wake up, it's morning yet it feels like no time had passed.
Does what it says on the tin.
I'd say that in terms of evidence I'd want to establish specific functional criteria that seem related to consciousness and then try to establish those criteria existing in agents. If we can do so, then they're conscious. My layman understanding is that they don't really come close to some of the fairly fundamental assumptions.
Unsurprisingly, there are a lot of frameworks for this that have already been applied to LLMs.
Even fungi demonstrate “different communication behaviors when under resource constraint”, for example.
What we anthropomorphize is one thing, but demonstrable patterns of behavior are another.
Sometimes the whole animal kingdom, sometimes all living organisms, depending on context. Like, I would rather not harm a mosquito, but if it’s in my house I will feel no remorse for killing it.
LLMs, or any other artificial “life”, I simply do not and will not care about, even though I accept that to some extent my entire consciousness can be simulated neuron by neuron in a large enough computer. Fuck that guy, tbh.
Bundle of tokens comes in, bundle of tokens comes out. If there is any trace of consciousness or subjectivity in there, it exists only while matrices are being multiplied.
Gaps in which no processing occurs seems sort of irrelevant to me.
The main limitation I'd point to if I wanted to reject LLMs being conscious is that they're minimally recurrent if at all.
It is like a crystal that shows beautiful colours when you shine a light through it. You can play with different kinds of lights and patterns, or you can put it in a drawer and forget about it: the crystal doesn’t care anyway.
while (sampled_token != END_OF_TEXT) {
probability_set = LLM(context_list)
sampled_token = sampler(probability_set)
context_list.append(sampled_token)
}
LLM() is a pure function. The only "memory" is context_list. You can change it any way you like and LLM() will never know. It doesn't have time as an input.A brain cut from its body and frozen its a dead brain.
The Chinese Room would like a word.
But this distraction aside, my point is this: there is only mechanism. If someone’s demand to accept consciousness in some other entity is to experience those experiences for themselves, then that’s a nonsensical demand. You might just as well assume everyone and everything else is a philosophical zombie.
Sure I would. The human part is not being inferenced, the data is. LLM output in this circumstance is no more conscious than a book that you read by flipping to random pages.
> You might just as well assume everyone and everything else is a philosophical zombie.
I don't assume anything about everyone or everything's intelligence. I have a healthy distrust of all claims.
And sure, you can assume that nobody and nothing else is conscious (I think we’re talking about this rather than intelligence) and I won’t try to stop you, I just don’t think it’s a very useful stance. It kind of means that assuming consciousness or not means nothing, since it changes nothing, which is more or less what I’m saying.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of...