You also have the verification happening in the right place. The person who maintains the Arch curl package knows where they got it and what changes they made to it. Some central signing authority knows what, that the Arch guy sent them some code they don't have the resources to audit? But then you have two different ways to get pwned, because you get signed malicious code if a compromised maintainer sends it to the central authority be signed or if the central authority gets compromised and signs whatever they want.
The downside to a centralized authority is that they're a single point of failure. PKIs like the Web PKI mediate this by having multiple central authorities (each issuing CA) and forcing them to engage in cryptographically verifiable audibility schemes that keep them honest (certificate transparency).
It's worth noting that the kind of "small trusted keyring" topology used by Debian, Arch, etc. is a form of centralized signing. It's just an ad-hoc one.
[1] https://shop.certum.eu/open-source-code-signing.html
[2] https://comodosslstore.com/code-signing/comodo-individual-co...