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> On Qubes, you do not create a new identity in the same VM. This would go against the Qubes approach to security/privacy. Using separate VMs for independent tasks is the whole point of using Qubes.

This is technically incorrect information and could get people in trouble if followed literally.

On Qubes OS, if a user creates a new identity inside a Whonix workstation disposable VM via the browser's new identity functionality, the new identity spawns within the same disposable VM. I just tested this on Qubes OS 4.3.

That, I assume would expose one to OP's vulnerability, as its still running in the same VM. I would be glad to learn that I'm incorrect in my unverified assumption.

Even Qubes OS users still need to be mindful to launch new disposable VM when keeping identities separate to sidestep this attack.

by fsflover6 hours ago|

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You are right, and I am saying exactly the same thing. You seem to misunderstand that Qubes saves you whenever you use it as designed by its security approach. To benefit from Qubes security, you have to use virtualization to compartmentalize your tasks. Only virtualization is a guarantee of security. Everything running in the same domain is assumed to be not isolated, and a compromise would affect everything in it. Even root access has no password by default in VMs. So what you're saying is obvious to any Qubes user. This is why I didn't mention it. (But I should have indeed.)

By you reasoning, Qubes doesn't provide more protection than the underlying operating systems. I've seen this myth on HN multiple times.