upvote

points

by zerkten22 hours ago |
comments
upvoteby brightball22 hours ago|
next
[-]
The problem is that the UX with a browser extension is so much better.
reply
upvoteby tracker122 hours ago|
parent|
next
[-]
I also find it far easier to resist accidentally entering credentials in a phishing site... I'm pretty good about checking, but it's something I tend to point out to family and friends to triple check if it doesn't auto suggest the right site.
reply
upvoteby brightball22 hours ago|
parent|
next
[-]
Exactly. Same principle of passkeys, Yubikeys and FIDO2. Much harder to phish because the domains have to match.
reply
upvoteby Barbing22 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
[-]
I’m impressed with their feature to add the URL for next time, after manually filling on an unmatched URI. Hairs raised on neck clicking confirm though.
reply
upvoteby ufmace22 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
next
[-]
Importantly IMO is the extra phishing protection that the UX is really nice if and only if the url matches what's expected. If you end up on a fake url somehow, it's a nice speed bump that it doesn't let you auto-fill to make you think, hold on, something is wrong here.

If you're used to the clunkier workflow of copy-pasting from a separate app, then it's much easier to absent-mindedly repeat it for a not-quite-right url.

reply
upvoteby QuantumNomad_22 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
next
[-]
The 1Password mobile and desktop apps have such a nice UX that I’m happy copy pasting from and into it instead of having any of the browser extensions enabled.

I have 1Password configured to require password to unlock once per 24 hours. Rest of the time I have it running in the background or unlock it with TouchID (on the MacBook Pro) or FaceID (on the iPhone).

It also helps that I don’t really sign into a ton of services all the time. Mostly I log into HN, and GitHub, and a couple of others. A lot of my usage of 1Password is also centered around other kinds of passwords, like passwords that I use to protect some SSH keys, and passwords for the disk encryption of external hard drives, etc.

reply
upvoteby embedding-shape22 hours ago|
parent|
[-]
> The 1Password mobile and desktop apps have such a nice UX that I’m happy copy pasting from and into it instead of having any of the browser extensions enabled.

Also a great way of missing out on one of the best protections of password managers; completely eliminating phishing even without requiring thinking. And yes, still requires you to avoid manually copy-pasting without thinking when it doesn't work, but so much better than the current approach you're taking, which basically offers 0 protection against phishing.

reply
upvoteby yborg22 hours ago|
parent|
next
[-]
My approach is that for critical sites like banking, I use the site URL stored in the password manager too, I don't navigate via any link clicking. I personally am fine with thinking when my entire net worth is potentially at stake.
reply
upvoteby embedding-shape22 hours ago|
parent|
[-]
It's not only about how you get there, but that the autofill shows/doesn't show, which is the true indicator (beyond the URL) if you're in the right place or not.

Rouge browser extensions for example could redirect you away from the bank website (if the bank website has poor security) when you go there, so even if you use the URL from the password manager, if you don't use the autofill feature, you can still get phished. And if the autofill doesn't show, and you mindlessly copy-paste, you'd still get phished. It's really the autofill that protects you here, not the URL in the password manager.

reply
upvoteby QuantumNomad_21 hours ago|
parent|
next
[-]
If you have rogue browser extensions installed, the browser extension can surely read the values that got filled into the login page without having to redirect to another site.
reply
upvoteby embedding-shape21 hours ago|
parent|
[-]
Not necessarily, a user could have accepted a permission request for some (legit) redirect extension that never asked for content permission, then when the rogue actor takes over, they want to compromise users and not change the already accepted permissions.

Concretely, I think for redirect browser extension users I'd use "webRequest" permission, while for in page access you'd need a content-script for specific pages, so in practice they differ in what the extension gets access to.

reply
upvoteby akimbostrawman7 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
[-]
You don't need a autofill for a indicator. Simply bookmark your banks login page, even if it gets silently redirected later you will notice as the page wont be bookmarked anymore.
reply
upvoteby QuantumNomad_22 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
[-]
In Safari on iOS I have all the main pages I use as favourites, so that they show on the home screen of Safari.

Likewise I have links in the bookmarks bar on desktop.

I use these links to navigate to the main sites I use. And log in from there.

I don’t really need to think that way either.

But I agree that eliminating the possibility all-together is a nice benefit of using the browser integration, that I am missing out on by not using it.

reply
upvoteby embedding-shape21 hours ago|
parent|
[-]
Which works great until tags.tiqcdn.com, insuit.net or widget-mediator.zopim.com (example 3rd party domains loaded when you enter the landing page from some local banks) get compromised. I guess it's less likely to happen with the bigger banks, my main bank doesn't seem to load any scripts from 3rd party as an counter-example. Still, rouge browser extensions still scare me, although I only have like three installed.
reply
upvoteby tredre319 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
next
[-]
> The problem is that the UX with a browser extension is so much better.

It's better, but calling it so much better [that it's unreasonable to forgo the browser extension] is a bit silly to me.

1. Go to website login page

2. trigger the global shortcut that will invoke your password manager

3. Your password manager will appear with the correct entry usually preselected, if not type 3 letters of the site's name.

4. Press enter to perform the auto type sequence.

There, an entire class of exploits entirely avoided. No more injecting third party JS in all pages. No more keeping an listening socket in your password manager, ready to give away all your secrets.

The tradeoff? You now have to manually press ctrl+shift+space or whatever instead when you need to log in.

reply
upvoteby Ritewut19 hours ago|
parent|
next
[-]
The tradeoff is that you need to know how to setup a global shortcut or even know it's even possible. I wish people would stop minimizing the knowledge they have as something everyone just knows.
reply
upvoteby dwedge18 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
[-]
How do you set up this shortcut? I'd prefer to get rid of extensions, if for no better reason than sometimes it switches to my work profile and I have to re-login
reply
upvoteby lern_too_spel21 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
[-]
Also, you want to avoid exposing your passwords through the clipboard as much as possible.
reply
upvoteby archargelod12 hours ago|
parent|
[-]
On unix-like OSes you can use `xsel` and configure it to clear clipboard after a single paste and/or after a set period of time.
reply
upvoteby flossly15 hours ago|
prev|
next
[-]
On iOS I feel I have less control over what's running than on Linux (dont get me started on Windows or Android). So that's the order of how I dare to use it. But a supply chain attack: I'll always use a distributed program: the only thing I can do is only use old versions, and trusted distribution channels.
reply
upvoteby WhyNotHugo20 hours ago|
prev|
next
[-]
In theory the browser integration shouldn’t leak anything beyond the credentials being used, even if compromised.

When you use autofill, the native application will prompt to disclose credentials to the extension. At that point, only those credentials go over the wire. Others remain inaccessible to the extension.

reply
upvoteby 15 hours ago|
prev|
[-]
deleted
reply