A real world second doesn't mean anything to the LLM from its own perspective. A second is only relevant to them as it pertains to us.
Time for LLMs is measured in tokens. That's what ticks their clock forward.
I suppose you could make time relevant for an LLM by making the LLM run in a loop that constantly polls for information. Or maybe you can keep feeding it input so much that it's constantly running and has to start filtering some of it out to function.
The inverse of anthropomorphism isn't any more sane, you see. By analogy: just because a drone is not an airplane, doesn't mean it can't fly!
Instead, just look at what the thing is doing.
LLMs absolutely have some form of intent (their current task) and some form of reasoning (what else is step-by-step doing?) . Call it simulated intent and simulated reasoning if you must.
Meanwhile they also have the property where if they have the ability to destroy all your data, they absolutely will find a way. (Or: "the probability of catastrophic action approaches certainty if the capability exists" but people can get tired of talking like that).
That's like saying a 2000cc 4-Cylinder Engine "has the intent to move backward". Even with a very generous definition of "intent", the component is not the system, and we're operating in context where the distinction matters. The LLM's intent is to supply "good" appended text.
If it had that kind of intent, we wouldn't be able to make it jump the rails so easily with prompt injection.
> and reasoning (what else is step-by-step doing?) .
Oh, that's easy: "Reasoning" models are just tweaking the document style so that characters engage in film noir-style internal monologues, latent text that is not usually acted-out towards the real human user.
Each iteration leaves more co-generated clues for the next iteration to pick up, reducing weird jumps and bolstering the illusion that the ephemeral character has a consistent "mind."
Fair, but typically you use a 2000cc engine in a car. Without the gearbox, drive train, wheels, chassis, etc attached, the engine sits there and makes noise. When used in practice, it does in fact make the car go forward and backward.
Strictly the model itself doesn't have intent, ofc. But in practice you add a context, memory system, some form of prompting requiring "make a plan", and especially <Skills> . In practice there's definitely -well- a very strong directionality to the whole thing.
> and bolstering the illusion that the ephemeral character has a consistent "mind."
And here I thought it allowed a next token predictor to cycle back to the beginning of the process, so that now you can use tokens that were previously "in the future". Compare eg. multi pass assemblers which use the same trick.
They have momentum, not intent. They don’t think, build a plan internally, and then start creating tokens to achieve the plan. Echoing tokens is all there is. It’s like an avalanche or a pachinko machine, not an animal.
> some form of reasoning (what else is step-by-step doing?)
I think they reflect the reasoning that is baked into language, but go no deeper. “I am a <noun>” is much more likely than “I am a <gibberish>”. I think reasoning is more involved than this advanced game of mad libs.
Strictly for raw models, most now do train on chain-of-thought, but the planning step may need to be prompted in the harness or your own prompt. Since the model is autoregressive, once it generates a thing that looks like a plan it will then proceed to follow said plan, since now the best predicted next tokens are tokens that adhere to it.
Or, in plain english, it's fairly easy to have an AI with something that is the practical functional equivalent of intent, and many real world applications now do.
It's not a real reasoning step, it's a sequence of steps, carried out in English (not in the same "internal space" as human thought - every time the model outputs a token the entire internal state vector and all the possibilities it represents is reduced down to a concrete token output) that looks like reasoning. But it is still, as you say, autoregressive.
And thus - in plain english - it is determined entirely by the prompt and the random initial seed. I don't know what that is but I know it's not intent.
Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial are two different forms of Anthropocentrism.
But the really interesting story to me is when you look at the LLM in its own right, to see what it's actually doing.
I'm not disputing the autoregressive framing. I fully admit I started it myself!
But once we're there, what I really wanted to say (just like Turing and Dijkstra did), is that the really interesting question isn't "is it really thinking?" , but what this kind of process is doing, is it useful, what can I do or play with it, and -relevant to this particular story- what can go (catastrophically) wrong.
The main difference is the training part and that it's always-on.
And in fact LLMs can very well "reason based on prior data points". That's what a chat session is. It's just that this is transient for cost reasons.
That's just a claim. Why so? Who said that's the case?
>When you go about your day doing your tasks, do you require terajoules of energy?
That's the definition of irrelevant. ENIAC needed 150 kW to do about 5,000 additions per second. A modern high-end GPU uses about 450 W to do around 80 trillion floating-point operations per second. That’s roughly 16 billion times the operation rate at about 1/333 the power, or around 5 trillion times better energy efficiency per operation.
Given such increase being possible, one can expect a future computer being able to run our mental tasks level of calculation, with similar or better efficiency than us.
Furthermore, "turing machine" is an abstraction. Modern CPUs/GPUs aren't turing machines either, in a pragmatic sense, they have a totally different architecture. And our brains have yet another architecture (more efficient at the kind of calculations they need).
What's important is computational expressiveness, and nothing you wrote proves that the brains architecture can't me modelled algorithmically and run in an equally efficient machine.
Even equally efficient is a red herring. If it's 1/10000 less efficient would it matter for whether the brain can be modelled or not? No, it would just speak to the effectiveness of our architecture.
You are a fool if you think otherwise. Are we conscious beings? Who knows, but we’re more than a neural network outputting tokens.
Firstly, and most obviously, we aren’t LLMs, for Pete’s sake.
There are parts of our brains which are understood (kinda) and there are parts which aren’t. Some parts are neural networks, yes. Are all? I don’t know, but the training humans get is coupled with the pain and embarrassment of mistakes, the ability to learn while training (since we never stop training, really), and our own desires to reach our own goals for our own reasons.
I’m not spiritual in any way, and I view all living beings as biological machines, so don’t assume that I am coming from some “higher purpose” point of view.
That's just stating a claim though. Why is that so?
Mine is reffering to the "brain as prediction machine" establised theory. Plus on all we know for the brain's operation (neurons, connections, firings, etc).
>There are parts of our brains which are understood (kinda) and there are parts which aren’t. Some parts are neural networks, yes. Are all?
What parts aren't? Can those parts still be algorithmically described and modelled as some information exchange/processing?
>but the training humans get is coupled with the pain and embarrassment of mistakes
Those are versions of negative feedback. We can do similar things to neural networks (including human preference feedback, penalties, and low scores).
>the ability to learn while training (since we never stop training, really)
I already covered that: "The main difference is the training part and that it's always-on."
We do have NNs that are continuously training and updating weights (even in production).
For big LLMs it's impractical because of the cost, otherwise totally doable. In fact, a chat session kind of does that too, but it's transient.
They're biological neural networks. Brains are made of neurons (which Do The Thing... mysteriously, somehow. Papers are inconclusive!) , Glia Cells (which support the neurons), and also several other tissues for (obvious?) things like blood vessels, which you need to power the whole thing, and other such management hardware.
Bioneurons are a bit more powerful than what artificial intelligence folks call 'neurons' these days. They have built in computation and learning capabilities. For some of them, you need hundreds of AI neurons to simulate their function even partially. And there's still bits people don't quite get about them.
But weights and prediction? That's the next emergence level up, we're not talking about hardware there. That said, the biological mechanisms aren't fully elucidated, so I bet there's still some surprises there.
How exactly? Except via handwaving? I refer to the "brain as prediction machine theory" which is the dominant one atm.
>you can even ask an LLM and it will tell you our brains work differently to it
It will just tell me platitudes based on weights of the millions of books and articles and such on its training. Kind of like what a human would tell me.
>and that’s not even including the possibility that we have a soul or any other spiritual substrait.
That's good, because I wasn't including it either.
It isn’t because humans and current LLMs have radically different architectures
LLMs: training and inference are two separate processes; weights are modifiable during training, static/fixed/read-only at runtime
Humans: training and inference are integrated and run together; weights are dynamic, continuously updated in response to new experiences
You can scale current LLM architectures as far as you want, it will never compete with humans because it architecturally lacks their dynamism
Actually scaling to humans is going to require fundamentally new architectures-which some people are working on, but it isn’t clear if any of them have succeeded yet
True, but we have RAG to offset that.
> it architecturally lacks their dynamism
We'll get there eventually. Keep in mind that the brain is now about 300k years into fine-tuning itself as this species classified as homo sapiens. LLMs haven't even been around for 5 years yet.
In practice that doesn’t always work… I’ve seen cases where (a) the answer is in the RAG but the model can’t find it because it didn’t use the right search terms-embeddings and vector search reduces the incidence of that but cannot eliminate it; (b) the model decided not to use the search tool because it thought the answer was so obvious that tool use was unnecessary; (c) model doubts, rejects, or forgets the tool call results because they contradict the weights; (d) contradictions between data in weights and data in RAG produce contradictory or ineloquent output; (e) the data in the RAG is overly diffuse and the tool fails to surface enough of it to produce the kind of synthesis of it all which you’d get if the same info was in the weights
This is especially the case when the facts have changed radically since the model was trained, e.g. “who is the Supreme Leader of Iran?”
> We'll get there eventually. Keep in mind that the brain is now about 300k years into fine-tuning itself as this species classified as homo sapiens. LLMs haven't even been around for 5 years yet.
We probably will eventually-but I doubt we’ll get there purely by scaling existing approaches-more likely, novel ideas nobody has even thought of yet will prove essential, and a human-level AI model will have radical architectural differences from the current generation
AlphaZero isn’t a LLM. There are Feed Forward networks, recurrent networks, convolutional networks, transformer networks, generative adversarial networks.
Brains have many different regions each with different architectures. None of them work like LLMs. Not even our language centres are structured or trained anything like LLMs.
Language came after conceptual modeling of the world around us. We're surrounded by social species with theory of mind and even the ability to recognise themselves and communicate with each other, but none of them have language. Even the communications faculties they have operate in completely different parts of their brains than ours with completely different structure. Actually we still have those parts of the brain too.
Conceptual representation and modeling came first, then language came along to communicate those concepts. LLMs are the other way around, linguistic tokens come first and they just stream out more of them.
This is why Noam Chomsky was adamant that what LLMs are actually doing in terms of architecture and function has nothing to do with language. At first I thought he must be wrong, he mustn't know how these things work, but the more I dug into it the more I realised he was right. He did know, and he was analysing this as a linguist with a deep understanding of the cognitive processes of language.
To say that brains are language models you have to ditch completely what the term language model actually means in AI research.
That's irrelevant though, since all the above are still prediction machines based on weights.
If you're ok with the brain being that, then you just changed the architecture (from LLM-like), not the concept.
An LLM is a specific neural architectural structure and training process. Brains are also neural networks, but they are otherwise nothing at all like LLMs and don't function the ways LLMs do architecturally other than being neural networks.
We do not have all the answers or a complete understanding of everything.
I'm not claiming that to be the case, merely pointing out that you don't appear to have a reasonable claim to the contrary.
> not even including the possibility that we have a soul or any other spiritual substrait.
If we're going to veer off into mysticism then the LLM discussion is also going to get a lot weirder. Perhaps we ought to stick to a materialist scientific approach?
If by “functionally equivalent” you mean “can produce similar linguistic outputs in some domains,” then sure we’re already there in some narrow cases. But that’s a very thin slice of what brains do, and thus not functionally equivalent at all.
There are a few non-mystical, testable differences that matter:
- Online learning vs. frozen inference: brains update continuously from tiny amounts of data, LLMs do not
- Grounding: human cognition is tied to perception, action, and feedback from the world. LLMs operate over symbol sequences divorced from direct experience.
- Memory: humans have persistent, multi-scale memory (episodic, procedural, etc.) that integrates over a lifetime. LLM “memory” is either weights (static) or context (ephemeral).
- Agency: brains are part of systems that generate their own goals and act on the world. LLMs optimize a fixed objective (next-token prediction) and don’t have endogenous drives.
Both have mass, have carbon based, both contain DNA/RNA, both are suprinsingly over 50% water, both are food, and both can be tasty when served right.
From other aspects they are not.
In many cases, one or the other would do. In other cases, you want something more special (e.g. more protein, or less fat).
The person I replied to made a definite claim (that we are "very obviously not ...") for which no evidence has been presented and which I posit humanity is currently unable to definitively answer in one direction or the other.