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Why should Google decide which devices are safe enough to pass remote attestation? Seems to me that if we want this at all, it should be an independent body that approves signing keys of vetted vendors (e.g. vendors roll out security updates timely, etc.).

As long as this is in Google's hands, they can abuse it to control the market.

That said, Play Integrity accepting GrapheneOS would be a step forward, but they will never do it, because then other vendors might also want to pass attestation without preloading Google apps.

by Hoodedcrow16 hours ago|

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> Seems to me that if we want this at all, it should be an independent body that approves signing keys of vetted vendors (e.g. vendors roll out security updates timely, etc.).

This is also a horrible idea. If an OS can be vetoed for untimely security updates, it can also be vetoed for not having something like clientside scanning.

by foltik15 hours ago|

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Then you’re just replacing one DRM cartel with another.

What would even be the criteria for approval? Pinky promise to not let the end user have full control of their own device? That’s all “integrity” really means in practice. Don’t be fooled by appeals to security.

by thomastjeffery16 hours ago|

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No. That would be a relatively better circumstance, but we would still have the root problem.

> Most of the thread seems to be a call for attestation to die, which feels impractical and unachievable.

I disagree, and I expect GrapheneOS devs do, too. Hardware attestation is a new thing, that isn't even really here yet. It absolutely can and should meet its demise.