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by p1necone3 hours ago |
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upvoteby scoofy2 hours ago|
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I think that "impossible to detect" is not something realistic if camera manufacturers are willing to start adding encryption signatures to their cameras outputs and are willing to vouch for them.

I realize this would still allow fakes to be presented by governments in all likelihood, but not everyone.

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upvoteby Ajedi322 hours ago|
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Who posts raw output from cameras anywhere? This doesn't seem useful outside some niche use-cases (like security camera footage). At a minimum just about every recording is going to be re-compressed for streaming.
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upvoteby mapontosevenths2 hours ago|
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Synthid and the like survive compression and decent quality rerecording.
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upvoteby AmbroseBierce2 hours ago|
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I bet the cameras' companies will start automatically uploading the real footage to their servers for attestation, and allow the camera owners to get those links, so people will just add that link on YouTube or whatever and say "See, its real, Sony vouches for it", heck maybe they will make their buyers to sign up with YouTube and do it for them.
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upvoteby thfuran2 hours ago|
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How on top of security do you think all the camera manufacturers are going to be? That is, how long until people can sign videos that were not, in fact, shot with their camera?
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upvoteby AmbroseBierce2 hours ago|
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Proving that you were able to upload something that is not real would go viral so it's very attractive to people to share such findings, meaning it would not last long, then they fix it and that's it, specially because they can require you to upgrade your camera's firmware if you want to keep using their attestation service.
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upvoteby pixl971 hours ago|
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Depends on what kind of compromise occurs. Hardware level key loss isn't easy, if possible at all to fix.
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upvoteby prirun2 hours ago|
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Only if you're paying them
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upvoteby AmbroseBierce1 hours ago|
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Attention is valuable these days, so making people go to their websites for people to check if something is real is good for them, its people they can try to sell more cameras (or phones) and all that.
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upvoteby exe342 hours ago|
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They can attest pictures of my hairy pendulous ballsack.
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upvoteby AmbroseBierce2 hours ago|
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Joking and all but sexting would benefit from this technology, if it can vouch about the time, GPS location and email address of the owner then the receiver can have some certainty about the pic (if the sender decides to share such attestation link/info, of course)
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upvoteby scoofy2 hours ago|
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I don't think it needs do be raw output. I'm pretty sure that signatures can exist within image and sound outputs that are reproducible when changing to other formats.
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upvoteby paulddraper2 hours ago|
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Yeah I’m not sure this makes sense when images are getting their third ifunny watermark.
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upvoteby _verandaguy2 hours ago|
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Leica started doing this a few years ago in response to the first wave of AI images[0]. Other, bigger manufacturers (Nikon, Canon, Sony as well I believe) have also joined, though with less fanfare. Adobe is in the loop.

As someone with a passing interest in infosec and cryptography, I'm sceptical of the long-term viability of this kind of product; it only takes one person successfully extracting a signing key to undermine the entire project.

    [0] https://leica-camera.com/en-int/news/partnership-greater-trust-digital-photography-leica-and-content-authenticity-initiative
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upvoteby scoofy2 hours ago|
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Yes, you're correct about private keys getting exposed, but it's better than nothing. I suspect though, even after key exposure there may be a way to make new private keys so that compromised keys have a known point when they are compromised, which makes public how much skepticism we should all have about authenticity.

I just think there is a world of difference between "certainty" and "plausibility" when it comes to videos on the internet. Yes, state actors might circumvent it, and skepticism should remain, but there is a world of difference between North Korea trying to convince me of some political scandal, and Pepsi Co trying to convince me that someone I trust loves Pepsi.

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upvoteby Gigachad2 hours ago|
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Cameras have a very long lifespan. People will still be using those cameras 20 years after the keys for their model get leaked.
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upvoteby scoofy1 hours ago|
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And they will also get firmware updates.
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upvoteby Gigachad1 hours ago|
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I currently use a 2008 Fujifilm camera and a 2018 Sony. The Fujifilm doesn’t even have a firmware update mechanism, and the Sony camera doesn’t get updated anymore. These devices are rarely connected to the internet and never go obsolete so they get used until they break.

There might be a specialised line of cameras for forensics that signs the output and has lidar to detect when the camera is pointed at a screen, but the average person won’t have a camera with this kind of crypto. It would just be too easy for hackers to extract the keys from.

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upvoteby p1necone2 hours ago|
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You still ultimately have the analogue hole here - pull the camera apart, splice your own hardware somewhere between the sensor and the thing that adds the signatures (or in front of the sensor).
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upvoteby 7jjjjjjj58 minutes ago|
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Or just straight up point the camera at a computer monitor, without even trying to hide it. Most of the security camera footage online is already uploaded this way.
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upvoteby Ukv2 hours ago|
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Pointing the camera at a screen could potentially evade that.
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upvoteby scoofy2 hours ago|
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Right, but my point is that a video of a screen should be less believable than the source video insofar as verifying legitimacy.
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upvoteby Ukv2 hours ago|
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I feel it wouldn't be too difficult to get a social-media video to look convincing enough even with just a regular camera and monitor, at least after compression (if end users aren't served raw footage directly, and instead trust the attestation of the site).
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upvoteby scoofy2 hours ago|
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Right, my point is that this should default to "untrustworthy." The idea is that a camera would at the very least include a timestamp and camera type in the signature. That signature should usually be reproducible when being filmed by another camera (these signatures can be part of the physical image). This should mean that a cameras filming screens would have multiple ways to show the images are not legitimate (as something as simple of shadows not matching time of day could show the video is illegitimate).
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upvoteby Retr0id2 hours ago|
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What if you can't tell it's a video of a screen?
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upvoteby himata41132 hours ago|
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wouldn't that just encourage monopolistic behavior and lockdown of these devices?

they're already locked down as-is.

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upvoteby tombert2 hours ago|
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Isn't this literally how GANNs are trained?
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upvoteby hungryhobbit3 hours ago|
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"AI generated video that's impossible to detect" is already something many companies are working on; it's hardly Google-specific.
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upvoteby FloorEgg2 hours ago|
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YouTube scale is Google specific
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upvoteby nicce2 hours ago|
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It already is quite impossible. Just generate something decent with lower quality. Then maybe take screen recording of the output. Voila.
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upvoteby justinator2 hours ago|
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Then "low-quality for no reason in year the 2026 and beyond where phones shoot at 8k" become part of the heuristics.
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upvoteby Ukv2 hours ago|
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Would be a fairly weak heuristic, with most social media images/videos already being like that.
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upvoteby justinator1 hours ago|
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Being pedantic for no reason is one of the heuristics I use to judge how annoying yn users are
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upvoteby oblio2 hours ago|
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I find it super ironic that we're basically here: https://xkcd.com/1683/ now. The 90s and 00s tech people would be very disappointed :-))
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upvoteby mkhalil2 hours ago|
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> "while also working out how to make AI generated video that's impossible to detect."

what gives you that impression?

Google is spends millions of dollars researching and implementing SynthID [0]; ensuring all videos generated have a watermark to ensure they can be detected. As well as using SynthID to detect AI-generated videos, which is what I am guessing they are using @ YT to detect and label the AI videos.

I am far from a Google or AI fanboy, closer to an admiring hater, but I just don't see how they are making AI generated video impossible to detect if they are going out of the way to ensure SynthID /AI watermarks are present in any video generated on the platform.

unless you mean impossible to detect by human eyes; but if that's the case, so is everyone else. except everyone else is NOT spending resources on research for watermarking and keep the detection algorithms ahead of the curve.

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upvoteby AmbroseBierce2 hours ago|
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Yeah, like Google doesn't know other hundreds of companies are also generating videos and will without the slightest shred of doubt will use reinforced learning to bypass this detection, meaning directly asking Google's AI if a picture they modified is AI or not to improve their algorithms, they know vouching for video is as useful as vouching for AI generated texts, zero.
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upvoteby smrtinsert2 hours ago|
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Why is that tinfoil? That's just good business?
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