1. that artificial neurons are very restrictive model for actual neurons, let alone brain/organism, as there is more going on in neurons than a thresholded 0-1 activation
2. a brain does not function in isolation, but as regulator of the bodily functions (along with even more things). If you look at the brain in isolation to the body you don't really understand fully what it is doing unless you narrow your view a lot. Eg the brain modulates production of hormones, which in turn affects stuff like heart rate which then comes back to the brain as signal, in a feedback loop. Not to mention actual behaviour and interaction with the world. Toy models of organisms are not organisms.
3. "interaction between atoms" (or rather matter in general, as we have to take into account electrons, photons, gravity and a lot of other things that matter) is too general, too big, artificial neurons are a very useful (for applications) abstraction inspired by biological processes, but not modelling said underlying biology fully. Nobody can imo right now know if "computation" is a good model for "atom interactions" as in whether we can adequately enough model "atom interactions" in a computationally tractable way, and surely we do not do that right now except in very narrow scopes, and we have good reasons to believe that the current computational paradigms/turing machines are inadequate in doing that efficiently enough.
Does it matter that neurons are more complex than 0-1? Does the fact that transformer layers don't use purely thresholded 0-1 activation invalidate what you're saying?
How do you know that artificial neurons are less capable of producing consciousness than biological ones? How can other people independently verify this?
How does the embodied nature of human consciousness preclude consciousness emerging from a computational system? What is the definition of consciousness if it is precluded from occurring in a computational system but present in biological systems?
Why do you think exactly modeling interaction between atoms matters for consciousness? And where is the fidelity threshold? Is it the planck length?
Finally, a dumb question: how do we know humans are actually conscious, and where is the threshold between consciousness and unconsciousness? And do these criteria exclude all other forms, or other animals?
But calling them "unconscious" is a pretty high bar. Mice are conscious. The house sparrow pecking in my yard right now is conscious.
How do you know that toasters or rocks aren't conscious?
By saying that a computer program is not conscious you are also making an extraordinary claim. You would have to hold an agnostic position until there is a test for consciousness.
You are relying on intuitive obviousness and rhetoric to make the opposing side look ridiculous "how could a TOASTER be conscious, preposterous!", you aren't making a actual positive argument for your view.
I assume that we both think rocks are not conscious, but I'm genuinely unsure of how one could prove this.
LLMs know more than any human being, are simultaneously experts in nearly every field of science and humanities, are able to make novel mathematical discoveries, can write and understand every major written language, and can give you an intelligent answer to almost any question you pose to them.
How is that not human-level intelligence? If a human could do all of that, we would consider them a genius.