<https://www.eff.org/about/staff/joe-mullin>.
He's been working in that capacity with the EFF since at least 2018: <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/ipr-process-saves-80-c...>.
Your further objections are ... facile.
I'm working on a top-level comment on that point as I write this, given that this particular subthread is dead and thus invisible to most visitors to HN. My response highlights what seem to me salient points about other instances of violation of separation of powers, and of the history of the copyright office.
DMCA rulemaking is actually an example of something that would probably be constitutional if the executive did it--even if administrative agencies in general are unconstitutional. The DMCA creates civil and criminal penalties, and calls for rulemaking to define exceptions to those penalties. Defining exceptions to civil and criminal liability falls squarely within executive enforcement discretion.
It’s akin to the distinction between law and equity courts at common law.
Stepping back, both doctrines (non delegation, unitary executive) are fundamentally about the courts overstepping. If both houses of Congress pass a law creating an agency with a director that can only be fired for cause and the president signs it, the Supreme Court should stay out of it.
Enacting legislation is very difficult, the presumption of constitutionality should be taken more seriously.
That’s even worse. If that’s the case, Congress must adopt those exemptions by law. It can’t delegate lawmaking powers to its employees.
> Stepping back, both doctrines (non delegation, unitary executive) are fundamentally about the courts overstepping
Unless you toss out the concept of judicial review altogether, policing the structural rules of the constitution is exactly what the courts should be doing. The courts have no say about the merits of Congressional acts. But they should review whether Congress has allocated powers to various entities in a way that’s consistent with separation of powers.
But in this case we have a law passed by congress and signed by the president. There’s no need to step in, the ordinary political processes are more than sufficient. If the new President and congress doesn’t like what the last ones did they have the exact same tools at their disposal to undo it.
Let them play!
The US executive branch has very limited decision making bandwidth and it should really be reserved for matters of war and peace.
Your initial comment would have been far stronger if it had dropped the irrelevant ad hom I called out previously, and had clearly stated your concern with Congress both legislating and regulating copyright, through the Library of Congress.
This also makes the question of how the Library of Congress came to be empowered with executing and* regulating copyright of interest. You've failed to explore this history. I'm somewhat familiar with both copyright law and the history of the Library, though not as a lawyer, and not specifically on the history of copyright and the Library both being effectively an executive function of the Legislative.
That also makes me wonder what other cross-branch functional contradictions exist. One that comes to mind immediately are ALJs (administrative law judges), which operate under the Executive rather than Judiciary, with one notable area being immigration law. The Senate and House each have Seargents of Arms, a nominally executive law-enforcement role under the legislative.
And of course there's the question of the present Administration's view that not only is it a unitary executive, but apparently a unitary Legislative and Judiciary as well.
On that point, Congress cannot "set things up as it sees fit." The constitution goes to great lengths to create a complex, three-branch system of government with specific powers allocated to each branch. Anytime Congress creates something new, it has to fit it into the three-branch model in a way that is consistent with the principles of that model. It's like a "pure" microkernel in computer science: there is a framework that dictates what goes in kernel space versus user space. Except with the constitution, the structural principles are legally binding. You can't delegate executive functions to mere employees of the legislative branch, just like in a pure microkernel you can't put the GUI into the kernel.
In this case, the DMCA creates civil and criminal liability. Creating exceptions for that is the exercise of a quintessential executive power--enforcement discretion. That power must be allocated to an executive-branch agency.
If you concede that it looks like an executive agency then it actually seems quite proper that the executive control it.
I can see how someone might disagree with that for various reasons (see the article) but in context "if it looks like an executive branch agency, then the Executive branch should have control over it" seems like a great argument and one that would probably carry in Congress, they have tended to put executive agencies under control of the executive in the past.
no more major questions doctrine