The bigger thing. "Ask the agent to build it" is fine here because init.el is read-only damage. Worst case it writes a file you `git diff` before trusting. That's the safe end of the spectrum. The instinct breaks the moment the same agent is touching things you can't cheaply inspect: package installs, shell-outs in a hook, anything with a side effect off your disk.
The lesson I keep relearning building this stuff: an audit log after the fact tells you what broke, it doesn't stop it. What you actually want is a capability check before the agent acts. This run is allowed to write `~/.config`, not to curl-pipe-sh. Plus a trail you can't quietly rewrite later, a hash chain, not a log file anyone with write access can edit. For an init.el that's overkill. For an agent you'd let near `apt` or your dotfiles repo, it's the whole game.