> Your PDS operator can post as you, like things as you, follow people as you, and it would be cryptographically indistinguishable from your real activity. The signatures are valid.
Your domain name owner or DNS provider cannot redirect your domain name to a different server and cryptographically impersonate you.
It's not exactly the same thing but it's close.
In a social protocol or context, I would expect a private key to be in the private control of the individual, such as when someone uses their private key to sign an email or git commit.
The purpose of signing your emails or commits is to provide a good indicator that it actually came from you, not someone who managed to get access to your email account at the time.
This is true and it's still true in the ATProto ecosystem but in a different context.
It asserts that events and records are authored by your PDS, not by you specifically. Which is certainly closer to the intent of TLS certs.
And technically you can maintain a PDS proxy that can only host, broadcast events, and receive content but that doesn't have any keys or signing capabilities.
Then you can have a local PDS that does your signing and sends signed events and records (basically signed state updates) to the PDS proxy to actually emit to the network. This then allows you to lock your keys behind a hardware key to better lock everything down. Of course there are trade offs to this. If it requires physical auth then it can only work on one device at a time or you have to self host it homelab style at which point it might just make more sense to host the PDS yourself anyways.
There's a project thats working on this very thing but I've not kept up with it and I can't remember what the name of it is. If any ATproto people in the comments knows the name/link feel free to reply under this to enlighten me + everyone else.
That seems entirely normal. The PDS handles ATProto actions but it cannot modify the git signature (obviously!). It’s no different than the fact that GitHub can post that you’ve committed a “verified” badge commit by adding a new signing key to your account and signing new commits with it.
The storage entity can always claim power over this by reporting a new key and signatures with that key. Seems entirely normal.
I do agree they're not the same but the trust and risk are very similar.
They are similar in that: jerks can be jerks. But one of the jerks I've trusted for 30 years and I hardly know the the other jerk.
Socially whether you can explain off that your PDS acted maliciously or that it was hacked or whatever is a different story but if you keep recovery keys for your DID you can take back control and undo everything your PDS did that you didn't authorise pretty trivially. The UX for it needs to be improved but technically the process is super simple/straight forward.
And those recovery keys provide a mechanism for declaring "hey i didn't do this I was hacked" on top of specific events but nothing for taking advantage of that cryptographic opportunity has been built out yet.
If my DNS provider messes up, I revoke their DNSSEC keys and point my domain to a different provider.
Domain registration should be national public infrastructure.
The author's concern seems to be more focused on impersonation
And for lower bandwidth tasks, Tor Onions can't be beat. Just make sure to use 2fa on services you offer to keep the trash out. Things like fail2ban don't work the way you intend.
DNSSec is used to prevent unauthorized stealing of domains. Furthermore, if someone does steal one domain you own, they don't steal all your accounts across all domains. If they take over your hosting, that's a fixable problem -- you just repoint the domain.
Now, having said that, I designed the Safebox exactly to prevent these scenarios from happening, and create an actually solid foundation for decentralized social networking, AI workloads, etc. If anyone is interested, probably the best link to begin reading about it is: https://safebots.ai/about (If you do, I'd love to hear your thoughts)
You don't even have the frameworks that are available to protect domains. (Domain lock, transfer, etc.) And registrars are regulated by laws and frameworks in ways ATProto hosts aren't. Don't get me wrong, if a registrar transfers your domain due to a social engineering attack on the registrar, then you might lose it (an attacker almost did this to me once via a SIM swap, and I had to call GoDaddy to prevent the transfers). But that's not the same as, say, hacking the web hosting server.
In any case, tptacek, Safebox is supposed to solve these actual problems, by making sure no one can actually get into the box (no ssh, etc) so it's a "neutral ground" that no one can really "own", "redirect", steal keys or impersonate you. If you read https://safebots.ai/about you'll see what I'm talking about. If you do, I'd love to read any feedback you might have, given your background in security!
And regarding DNSSEC... if your domain is taken by the registrar (court order, ToS violation, etc.) or a government that can command the parent TLD to act, they can just revoke your old key and transfer the domain to someone else (or setup a placeholder under their own DNS) and now your protection and all concept of ownership is completely gone without your consent. This happened a few years ago with Epik seizing the soyjakparty and kiwifarms domains, including their hosting from a subsidiary company Terrahost... and KF has never even lost a lawsuit, but there are some specific people that really don't like them, and have gotten adept at claiming ToS violations via every possible company that touches them in order to try to make them go away.
Uh, no.
I can legally shoot and kill intruders due to castle doctrine and stand your ground laws in my physical home. And legal invasions require being in front of a judge and a search warrant.
A domain can be seized for 'terms of service' (aka kangaroo court) reasons. Stand your ground nor castle doctrine doesn't apply to your digital house.
How many houses were actually seized, repossessed, commandeered with "eminent domain", slowly taken over via "adverse possession", encroached on with easements and air rights, and whatever else? Versus how many domains?
There is no violence on the internet. You can't shoot intruders. And that's a great thing.
Put in legal terms, you do NOT have this level of ownership to your house... and you certainly do not have sovereign immunity on your land: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allodial_title
Usually the best you can get is this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fee_simple
You probably have something more like this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freehold_(law)
What you are describing is more like the king of England being able to shoot people on his own property, and have full sovereign immunity (in theory, I mean recently a British prince was arrested on allegations of far less).
That means if you are a home invader, I can legally shoot and kill you. There'll be an investigation, but both statutes are affirmative defenses to killing.
Its not that I want to, or look forward to it. I don't, and I hope I never have to. But I will, if I'm forced.
For example shooting a 5 year old kid who trespassed on your property isnt covered