Anyone with physical access. I think it is understandable from the phrase.

There is a common misconception about how lock-screens in general work - they usually just prevents using the current hardware and software as it is to access the current OS. But the disk encryption is the main thing that prevents modification and other kind of access to actual data. And if the disk encryption key is lying in the memory, then effectively, the disk encryption is bypassed if someone can access the machine physically and assuming that there are no sufficient tampering protections in place for that machine.

There are attacks that allow dumping RAM if the device is powered on though and you have physical access. Depending on config it may be very easy (just plug in a dumper over Thunderbolt on USB C and do direct memory access) or hard (freeze and swap physical RAM to an unlocked machine).. but the idea was defense-in-depth here; a well configured device should both be hard to dump RAM on and it should not give encryption keys if an attacker succeeds.

you dump the physical memory, then decrypt the disk offline