The IETF has published the russian TLS 1.2 standard (RFC 9189). This includes Kuznyechik, which is has a certain design choice consistent with it being backdoored.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuznyechik#Cryptanalysis

(the work by Perrin that is mentioned is what I'm referring to).

The (pure) mlkem standard is also marked "recommended to implement = No". people are interested in implementing it. The IETF can't change that. They can try to ensure such implementations are interoperable though.

Why do they forcibly retire weak algorithms? I think it does matter if half of SaaS services you use could be forcibly using them for your data and in some cases you might be a serious target mixed in among less serious targets.

Its called downgrade attacks, they are very bad, and they are caused by weak standards still being used. 3DES shouldn't be used anymore, but it is in the list of an acceptable cipher, so there goes the security out the window.