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Your claim does not match the reality, because at the previous IETF meeting most have voted like DJB.

I cannot see how any true "expert" would have the courage to claim that in a cryptography standard it is admissible to accept risks that cannot be quantified.

For the variant supported by DJB there are no risks, while for the variant supported by NSA nobody can estimate the risks.

It is as simple as this, so it is weird that there are people arguing about a decision that should have been non-controversial.

by mswphd1 hours ago|

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all cryptographic risks cannot be quantified. Every cryptographer knows this. It is consistent with everything we know that oneway functions do not exist, and cryptography as a field is limited to things like Merkle Puzzles/things that are secure under physical assumptions (e.g. the wiretap channel).

The variant DJB suggests there are explicit risks. For example

1. both ECC and ML-KEM can be broken (obviously)

2. additional code complexity could increase the LoC of teh crypto implementation, making it more plausible there are implementation bugs

regardless, this is a red herring. Nearly all cryptographers still support hybrids!!! The current RFC is *not* about "use pure ML-KEM". It is instead about "if you're going to use pure ML-kem (and we explicitly recommend not doing so), here is how to do it in a standardized way".

The people arguing about this decision don't even know what the decision being made is in the first place.