I tend to prefer the term subjective experience for what you describe as a meta-ability.

Consciousness is too overloaded by conflicting definitions.

We could at least imagine the possibility of something coming across as conscious in every way without having a subjective experience of self.

Even a fully deterministic view of consciousness can be compatible with a possible split between entities that act-as-if but without a subjective experience, and those with.

The problem is that there is no reasonable way to prove a subjective experience - we're stuck self reporting. We can't even prove other humans have subjective experience.

It is also not clear that it matters of such entities can act identically.

> It is the meta-ability to observe its own perceptions and thoughts. And a sense of self, a sense that the observer is the same over time.

Which is kind of strange because folks who achieve insight examining their own perceptions and thoughts seem to dissolve the barrier between self and not-self.