Property tax breaks in my locale lead to empty lots and empty buildings, which is the least efficient use of land imaginable. Property value seems to play a significant enough role in convincing land owners to sell their underutilized land if property taxes provide the activation energy to force them to sell. Otherwise they sit and speculate. So, your argument is convincing in theory, but appears to fall apart in practice. Aside, I’m a fan of Georgism in theory.

> Asset taxes in general create major perverse incentives because it causes underinvestment in the thing being taxed and overinvestment in any alternative that can act as a tax shelter, whether because the law exempts the alternative for some reason (e.g. lobbying), or it's hard to accurately value and therefore allows for chicanery, or it's in another jurisdiction.

I’m sure wealth managers are already devising strategies for reducing taxable wealth based on speculative laws and regulations. This shouldn’t be a reason not to proceed, but instead to put more resources to effective design.