To summarise my opinion, subjectively it seems like a better distinction could be made in GAAP to look through this agreement and others like it. (Hypothetically if Hertz agreed to rent back rather than repurchase, like mentioned in a previous comment, that would also be suspect). But I'm not the one to propose what the preconditions would be.
> Looking at the structure of the deal and analyzing the risks is perfectly valid. Screaming "accounting subterfuge!" when this is simple GAAP accounting is a different matter.
It can be legal and still be subterfuge. Everyone involved in the deal has a clear incentive to ensure Coreweave gets to recognise revenue, and gets to show growth on paper. It's the same reason why SoftBank paying OpenAI $800mln for services in 2025 stinks a bit - they don't need the services but the deal goes ahead anyway.
> This simply isn't true. Google "DGX Cloud". Nvidia has a real business selling cloud-based compute for training foundation models and running heavy AI workloads, and leasing compute from its hyperscaler chip customers instead of competing with them was a strategic decision Nvidia made.
Sorry - you're entirely correct here. Though remember we're talking about a scenario where Coreweave aren't able to sell their capacity. If there's such a dramatic hole in demand, who are NVIDIA selling their compute to? This repo agreement won't give NVIDIA capacity that they need in the 90% of cases but will force them to purchase capacity they won't need in the 10%.
s/10%/some other probability/
There's two things here: accounting and disclosure.
The accounting, which is what GAAP deals with, really doesn't seem problematic. CoreWeave is giving Nvidia cash for the chips and taking title to them. There's no associated repurchase right or obligation. So treating this as a sale and booking the revenue is the most sensible accounting approach. Trying to make it into something it's clearly not because it makes some people feel better isn't sensible.
I think the more important discussion is around disclosure: how much information Nvidia should be required to provide about its relationships with companies like CoreWeave, and where and when. Right now, we have to paint the picture based on multiple disclosures. We know about the equity stake through a 13F. The backstop was in an 8-K that was filed two years after the agreement was signed. The equity stake is not high enough that most of the rules around "related party" disclosures come into play.
I suppose you could make the argument that the market obviously sees the circularity here despite the patchwork disclosures that apply, so the circularity is ostensibly being priced in to the stock prices, debt, etc. But there's a legitimate argument that the market would be better served if disclosure was earlier and cleaner.
Even so, none of this would prevent Nvidia from engaging in these types of transactions because there's nothing inherently illegal about them.
NVIDIA itself is also training foundation models (and open-sourcing them). If there is excess compute available, NVIDIA can increase the scale of such models.
I'm not sure this is the case. They are agreeing to pay them some price, it's not clear whether they are getting them for cash or credit but I strongly suspect it's on credit. That doesn't change the GAAP compliance, does it? As I said before, I think they are exploiting an accounting loophole, regardless of whether it is strictly compliant.