There is no objective evidence of qualia. All evidence of qualia are vocal or other expressions of belief in qualia. Perceptions clearly exist and are observable, subjective experience and qualia, not so much.
> I see no reason to believe that a neural network built entirely based on the symbolic level of language could have the features needed for the subjective experience itself.
If your objection is to models based on "symbolic level of language" which you think lack semantic understanding of, say, trees, you should ask yourself how our brain, based on physics which also lacks any semantic category for trees, can somehow develop a semantic understanding of trees. All of these appeals to differences with the brain never seem to acknowledge that fundamentally, the brain has the same explanatory gap with physics.
> But if we assume awareness because outputs resemble what we consider meaningful as humans, yet the neural network has had no inputs or evolution that could form the actual basis of human-like experience
This assumes a lot. It seems very possible to me that intelligence inherently develops a map of natural categories (natural kinds), and language naturally develops around such categorical understanding. Semantics are then fundamentally the network of associations between categories, eg. there is no fundamental difference between symbols and semantics, and the latter cam be inferred from the former, and that's exactly what LLMs do, and why the semantic maps between different languages are so similar and how they can translate between languages.
You didn't address any of what I wrote, let alone provide any counterarguments. Which part of what I wrote do you think was wrong?
For example, the Turing machines and the lambda calculus don't look anything alike, but they are fundamentally interconvertible, and so in a real sense they are fundamentally equivalent. Without a model, all of your arguments are completely unconvincing for exactly the same reasons, eg. that there may exist many paths to fundamentally equivalent ends.
Hunger as a concept doesn't mean anything without the physical need. Politeness or bluntness, even in writing, don't mean anything without social dynamics. And we have social dynamics (and neural structures that directly process social cues and associated feelings) because we've evolved into social animals for whose survival that was important.
I see no reason to believe that a model trained only with symbolic representations, with no connection to the physical world phenomena that those symbols represent, could contain the subjective experience itself.
Neural network models may be able to derive novel (or at least novel-looking) output rather than just an obvious rehash of their input, but I don't think any set of bytes can fundamentally contain information that was never entered into it. (Even if e.g. a model produces previously unknown mathematical results, those results can in principle be derived from the information that they were trained with.)
I'm not saying that artificial neural networks couldn't, in principle, be aware. ANNs and biological neural nets may be equivalent in the sense that any information and processing structures represented by a biological one could in principle be represented by an artificial one. If that's the case, and awareness is purely a product of our neural systems as materialism would imply, it should be possible for an ANN to be aware, too.
But when the model has been trained with only language, and IMO the subjective experience can't be derived from the symbolic representation alone, I can't see how the model could include the actual subjective human experience.
An AI model could of course have an awareness and subjective experiences that are totally different than our human experience. But then the fact that it happens to produce output resembling what humans find meaningful shouldn't be considered indicative of such awareness.
This is of course more of a philosophical argument than a technical one, and I'm happy to hear counterarguments, but not on the level of off-hand dismissal.
People who say LLMs have subjective experience aren't saying they have human-type subjective experience. Nobody who sees an LLM express hunger when role playing as a hungry person thinks that the LLM is actually hungry.
I too can role play as a hungry person despite not being hungry, so there is no reason in either case to conclude that the words produced reflect genuine internal subjective states. The point is that such internal states may still exist.