ssh server keys can be authenticated using (the DNSSEC "CA" system and) SSHFP, and it's possible to setup a signing CA for the host key (similar to ssh certificates, however not applicable for foreign servers). And of course, the fingerprint could be advertised out of band e.g. on the homepage with tls
webpki is on by default.
Now we wait for the discovery of an RCE, key leakage vulnerability or a security bypass that leads to a trivial mitm attack to magnify why ssh apps make no sense security wise.
When I last harassed Crawshaw about this and we discussed bits, he submitted https://github.com/C2SP/C2SP/blob/main/well-known-ssh-hosts....
Unfortunately neither of us has taken time (AFAIK) to go back and implement it anywhere.
Honestly at this point I'd be kind of happy if we could just use an x.509 cert from a webpki acme provider in the sshd and be done with it, for the host identity part.
on terminal.shop, steal credit cards on jobs endpoints, perform identity theft on exe.dev, whatever you put on there