It's important to understand why things happen in order to prevent them, and to counter the narrative of the opinionated article. And if we should wait for the NTSB report, then so should the article.
I can point to at least one fatal crash that wouldn’t have happened if GPS was unavailable. Would it be reasonable to say that crash was caused by a lack of GPS jamming?
Something like GPS jamming isn't quite so bad. It's intuitively reasonable that reducing or degrading the information available to pilots will make things worse, and avoiding that is likely to improve safety. But it requires proper analysis to figure out the best thing to do, not a simplistic "this specific event wouldn't have happened if this specific fact had been different." That's what "cause" is about in a practical sense: not "what changes would have avoided this past event?" but "what changes improve our odds in the future?" And the first question isn't nearly enough to answer the second.
The preliminary NTSB report points toward “get gud”. If you request a visual approach and then fly into a mountain getting “gud” will be at top of the list.
For another I'd note that past investigations into accidents that at the surface were the pilot making a very bad decision have found a laundry list of underlying causes that need to be fixed. E.g. see Ontario Flight 1363 where the proximate cause was not de-icing a plane that clearly needed de-icing and the root causes after investigation were a whole lot of institutional issues.
And finally at a glance I note that the air traffic control tower appears to have approved this plane flying on instruments, a procedure only allowed when "local altimeter setting [is] received" - apparently referring to GPS. In doing so they had the military disable the jamming. The pilots appear to have communicated to the tower that they would be using that approval until further notice (notice that was anticipated in a couple of minutes). And that the tower apparently without informing the pilots appears to have approved restarting the GPS jamming... I'm not an expert but if I were asked to investigate this (a thing that non-experts are sometimes asked to do, e.g. with the aforementioned flight)... I suggest that this leads to obvious alternate theories of what went wrong such as instruments they had good cause to rely on silently misleading them.
The aircraft was completely legal to fly under IFR during the en route phase. There is no requirement for a local altimeter setting for that; center can provide an area altimeter setting (and does so on every handoff).
The lack of a local altimeter setting precluded the use of the instrument approaches (the way you transition from en route phase to landing). Both of the instrument approaches are "when local altimeter setting not received, procedure NA". That equally applies to the RNAV(GPS) and ILS approaches.
That doesn't make filing or flying a flight plan to that airport under IFR NA; it just means that you have to either cancel IFR or fly a visual approach (which, despite the name, is an IFR procedure). Both are legal and commonly done; you can even file an IFR flight plan to an airport that doesn't even have a published approach or to a point in space that isn't even an airport.
When the pilot asked for a visual approach, they were taking on the obligation for navigating to the airport and for terrain and obstacle clearance.
Smaller item: KSRR is a non-towered airport. All the relevant ATC contact was with Albuquerque Center, not with a local tower controller. (If there was a local tower controller, they would almost certainly have been able to provide a local altimeter setting, making the instrument approaches fully available.)
ILS-24: https://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/2607/06922IL24.PDF RNAV(GPS)-24: https://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/2607/06922R24.PDF
Are you suggesting however that "The flight crew acknowledged the clearance and responded that they would cancel IFR “in just a couple of minutes.”" meant the crew was informing the tower that they would transition to VFR? That seems... unlikely. I'm reading the paraphrasing here as towards declining to cancel the ILS approach they previously requested because it doesn't particularly make sense to me otherwise.
Which is really back to "this preliminary report doesn't, and doesn't even attempt to, assign blame or contain sufficient facts to do so".
It's very common to cancel IFR in the air, especially for late night operations to non-towered airports. (At an airport with an operating tower, they will close your IFR flight when you land.) At a non-towered airport, you have to either call on the phone or use a radio relay to close your flight plan, which can be a pain, so in benign conditions it's very common to cancel IFR in the air where you have line of sight [meaning good comms] to the ARTCC radio transceiver and avoid the hassle of bad cell phone coverage and/or no radio contact possible on the ground. (There is no radio relay at Ruidoso; the nearest RCAG is at Roswell, 50+ nm away with terrain in between.)
ZAB ARTCC's transmission that "they could cancel IFR in the air above 9,000 ft msl" tells the crew "once you get below 9000 MSL, you probably won't be able to talk to us on the radio".
When the crew said "we'll cancel IFR in a couple minutes", that's also common. It means "we're going to stay IFR and fly the visual until we're a little closer and landing is reasonably assured."
Ok, please just stop. A certain minimum level of knowledge is necessary to discuss these things and you don’t have it.
Pilots unable to fly with all the bells and whistles and getting their ass handed to them when anything falls out of the ordinary: too many
You are not supposed to need all the “bells and whistles” to fly, a plane is a plane and a pilot is in left seat meaning to fly the plane. There are checklists and minimum equipment lists that state what is possible and how to handle failures and control.
You can not automate that, yet.
But did you know for 'General Aviation' (small planes flown for recreation and suchlike) there are around 300 deaths per year in the US?
Your main point is the most valid - wait for the final report. But you should be saying the same to the article as written.
Prelim report: https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/G...
Out of my scope to infer.