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Well in this case there were multiple failures... Should they have been identified earlier? Yes.
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It's a truism that every accident is actually a chain of events, or at least it was 30+ years ago at Embry-Riddle. Lower stakes situations recognize this with the "5 whys" technique.
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In general I agree with this. (Without respect to this particular crash.)

If GPS signal is sufficiently degraded or lost, TAWS is probably unavailable (highly dependent on what navigation system is on board). TAWS might have saved them. But needing TAWS implies loss of situational awareness.

This flight crashed in the mountains ~6 miles north of the ILS 24 approach course. At ~12 miles out on the approach course, the ILS course width is ~1 mile. A full needle deflection translates to 1/2 mile off the course. A flight is not established on the approach course with a full needle deflection. Course intercept with localizer or VOR is basic instrument work - GPS not required.

The flight requested ILS 24, later they indicated airport in sight, requested and received a clearance for a visual approach. That means pilots have full responsibility for terrain and obstruction clearance. The visual approach requirement is to maintain contact with with airport.

It seems to me they went off course, by a lot, for reasons I'm not clear on, and then descended prematurely into hostile terrain at night, which is likely why they lost visual contact with the airport. The terrain blocked their view and by the time they realized they were descending into hostile terrain they crashed.

If that's what happened, GPS signal loss is perhaps an instigating source of distraction and confusion but I do not see how it's a primary factor. If the signal becomes degraded, navigation should indicate it (auditory and visual) and that source is ignored entirely. Falling back to ground based navigation should be familiar, it doesn't need to be as precise as GPS, the instrument approach procedure has terrain clearance baked into it.

Best practice is to follow the instrument approach procedure to the final approach fix, then do the visual approach - especially at night which many have argued constitutes instrument flight conditions - mountains will be invisible. Pitch black on black.

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Highly dependent on weather and the complexity of the approach. Clear skies and VFR? I would agree. Heavy weather and an instrument approach or confounding factors? Not accurate imho.

> At midnight on May 14, eight minutes after Clark and Kawsara took off from Roswell, they told Albuquerque Center that they’d lost their GPS. Unable to navigate on their own, they asked that the controller give them a heading—a magnetic direction to fly in. The controller gave them a heading to fly west, and then, a minute later, to turn north.

> The pilots said that they wanted to fly an RNAV approach to Ruidoso. This being ruled out while GPS is jammed, the King Air pilots changed their request and asked to use an alternate form of landing system called Instrument Landing System, or ILS, that doesn’t require GPS reception. At 12:05 am, the controller assured the King Air that they would provide them with vectors to guide them “in a couple of minutes.” In the meantime, they kept flying north.

> In retrospect, tragedy might have been avoided if Albuquerque air traffic control had been able to pay closer attention to the young pilots in the King Air. But tonight they were busy. Three other aircraft also reported that they’d lost their GPS and needed help. One was struggling to get a bearing on a radio beacon.

> As they turned and descended toward Ruidoso’s lights, what the pilots couldn’t see was the 10,000-foot-high mass of the Capitan Mountains lying across their path. As they drew closer, the dark mass of rock appeared to rise up, swiping away the lights of the valley. This could have created "confusion and a loss of situational awareness,” Browne says. “When those lights go out, man, you know you are in big trouble.”

Potentially low time pilots with degraded navigation aids at night (midnight) got behind the plane in an area with terrain, along with a high workload ATC not able to provide assistance more rapidly.

(disclaimer: have a private license)

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GPS is not, and never will be, reliable enough for IFR on its own.

Relying on a tower in instrument conditions because GPS failed is unacceptable, because every other GPS user is in the same boat.

If you’re flying IFR, you should have a working set of instruments and be using them. Why didn’t these pilots have their VORs tuned in for positioning?

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> GPS is not, and never will be, reliable enough for IFR on its own.

WAAS GPS (~7.6M accuracy) is reliable enough for IFR on its own that many approaches have removed legacy RF ILS equipment for instrument approaches (RNAV LPV with synthetic glidescope from GNSS). I would agree this does not apply to the vast majority of general aviation (although certified receivers supporting this are well within the reach of GA at ~$6k), but facts and specifics are important, so enumerating that GPS and these trimmings make it designed to replace traditional IFR equipment under certain circumstances. WAAS is not a paid service, the additional precision is free if your receiver and autopilot supports it.

Further reading:

https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/at...

https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2025/october/pi... ("Today most IFR pilots use GPS as a primary source of navigation, whether they’re flying a departure, airway, or arrival defined by VORs; or segments of approaches based on navaids or that require DME or ADF.") [My note: This is straight from the advocacy group for general aviation in the US, AOPA.]

https://www.flyingmag.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-...

https://boltflight.com/loc-vs-ils-vs-gps-approach-understand...

https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim_html...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wide_Area_Augmentation_System

> "The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) is an air navigation aid developed by the Federal Aviation Administration to augment the Global Positioning System (GPS), with the goal of improving its accuracy, integrity, and availability. Essentially, WAAS is intended to enable aircraft to rely on GPS for all phases of flight, including approaches with vertical guidance to any airport within its coverage area. It may be further enhanced with the local-area augmentation system (LAAS) also known by the preferred ICAO term ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) in critical areas."

> In 2007, WAAS vertical guidance was projected to be available nearly all the time (greater than 99%), and its coverage encompasses the full continental U.S., most of Alaska, northern Mexico, and southern Canada. At that time, the accuracy of WAAS would meet or exceed the requirements for Category 1 ILS approaches, namely, three-dimensional position information down to 200 feet (60 m) above touchdown zone elevation.

Category II or III ILS GPS approaches are supported when the subject airport has a local reference station reporting corrections ("LAAS"). With enough precision, the aircraft can land itself with GPS and local corrections ("Autoland"). A King Air running Garmin's SafeReturn recently performed this autonomously with GPS alone (to the best of my knowledge).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local-area_augmentation_system

https://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/non_federal/g...

Autoland saves King Air, everyone reported safe - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46346214 - December 2025 (185 comments)

Event ATC recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3Nl3LOZNjc

Demo: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-ruFmgTpqA

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It's demonstrated fact that GPS is not 100% reliable, which would be required to meet the "on its own" requirement. See the article you're commenting under, and documentation about it from the FAA [1].

[1] https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/av...

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100% reliable is not a requirement per FAA regs cited. Legacy navigation equipment fails too.
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Then I think you should re-read the original comment, with this revelation in mind.
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> Heavy weather and an instrument approach or confounding factors? Not accurate imho.

Then what are you supposed to do when your GPS craps out on approach in low visibility and heavy weather?

Obviously the answer is "fly the airplane". Which means you look at your artificial horizon, set trim and power for max climb, get to a safe altitude and figure it out.

If you're paying attention you already have your chart folded to the airport you're landing at, so it shouldn't be too hard to orient yourself and figure out what's next. Either you'll be making another attempt at this airport without GPS or you'll be going somewhere else.

There's never an excuse for failing to fly the airplane. That's basic airmanship. You need to be able to do it regardless of whether your GPS is working.

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It's very easy to write this comment when you're not the one getting behind the plane in the middle of the night with multiple simultaneous challenges (speaking from experience; I can feel the anxiety writing this comment from similar "white knuckle" experience), and I agree, keep flying the plane. Systems fail, that is the point of investigating incidents to improve systems. Humans are always the weakest link. I agree that an experienced pilot should be able to safely land on an approach assuming a loss of GPS.

(General aviation (GA) is significantly less safe than commercial air travel, tracking at roughly 1.0 to 1.1 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours. Statistically, GA's per-hour fatality rate is about 14 times higher than driving a car, carrying a risk profile comparable to riding a motorcycle)

Edit: My hot take is more communication and training needs to go into "As the pilot, you should be prepared to lose GPS at any time at critical moments in the flight lifecycle." Are we letting folks fly in potentially adverse conditions leaning too heavily on GPS leading to potentially avoidable accidents? I don't know, the NTSB is likely better informed to say so or not. If I was a flight instructor, I'd probably include loss of GPS during instrument approach at night and/or in weather as an experience to cover.

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> General aviation (GA) is significantly less safe than commercial air travel

Since I've been paying attention from the peanut gallery, watching Blancolirio videos, etc. I would never fly on a small private plane. Seems like once a week there is a crash of a small GA craft somewhere, often with fatalities, due to loss of control (i.e. nothing wrong with the aircraft). Pilots seem to become overconfident or complacent, make bad decisions instead of "gettimg out the credit card and booking a hotel" as Juan likes to say -- if you can afford to fly your own plane you can afford a night at a hotel. They can't handle loss of visual flight conditions. They don't recognize when they need to ignore their inner ear and trust the instruments. They can't recover from stalls or upsets (and actual practice isn't required, because that too caused a lot of crashes). Worse, they often take family and friends with them.

There's a reason a lot of life insurance policies specifically carve out private aircraft operation or travel as an exception to coverage.

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When I was training 20yr ago we practiced stalls, spin recovery, simulated random engine-out scenarios.. do they not do that anymore?

I was pretty confident barring some catastrophic mechanical failure I could probably get it on the ground or into the water (or trees) in one piece. The big question remains though: what now? If you're knocked unconscious (likely--lap belt, big flat instrument panel at face height) then two things can happen:

(1) if in the water, you drown before you can get out.

(2) if you're on land, the fuel tank right underneath that instrument panel or the ones up in the wings might torch you before you can get out.

It's probably about right to compare the risk profile to motorcycle riding.

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I'm not a pilot but as I understand it, stall/spin recovery practice is not mandatory anymore for a PPL and not all pilots do it, because it requires an aircraft designed for acrobatics and in practice a number of pilots ended up getting killed trying it. So now they learn it by the book or maybe playing with a flight simulator but not in an actual aircraft.
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Stall recovery is absolutely required to be instructed and demonstrated in the private pilot checkride. These are demonstrated to a full aerodynamic stall, not merely to stall warning.

Spin recovery is no longer required to be instructed (and was not previously required to be demonstrated during the practical test either [as many aircraft are placarded as "intentional spins prohibited"]).

CFR for the instruction requirements: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-D...

Airman Certification (Practical Test) Standards: https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/acs/private_air...

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Not a pilot either, but it's my understanding that accidental spins almost never happen at altitudes where they're recoverable. Preventing the spin is the only way to avoid most crashes involving spins.

Stalls, on the other hand are part of standard instruction. Recognizing the beginning of a stall early and preventing it will prevent the spin.

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Mechanical failure and engine outs will always rely on muscle memory and training imho, but I strongly presume everything else is going to be "Push red button to survive, switching to autonomy."

Garmin Is Automating In-Flight Emergencies (Autoland, Smart Glide, ESP) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48996106 - July 2026 (0 comments)

The accountability problem exposed by the first Garmin Autoland deployment - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46793561 - January 2026 (0 comments)

Autoland saves King Air, everyone reported safe - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46346214 - December 2025 (185 comments)

(Garman SafeReturn is reliant on GPS though, so unsure how it would handle loss of GPS during autonomous operations, I presume silicon photonics for precision dead reckoning as a backup nav input are the future, or perhaps relying on jam-resistant GPS services and/or multiple GNSS providers simultaneously)

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As I understand it, most GA crashes are not due to mechanical problems. Human things like loss of situational awareness, loss of control, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), flying into bad weather, and improper fuel management are much more common.
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The problem is things like regulation and litigation have pushed the price of those modern technologies up outside the reach of everyone who isn't filthy rich, meaning the average GA pilot is tooling around in a clapped-out rental C172 from the 80s.
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There's nothing inherently unsafe or unreliable about old airplanes. Aircraft maintenance and inspections are very rigorous and evidence based as compared with almost any other mechanical systems you might interact with. I flew a 1949 Piper PA-16 Clipper with a fairly anemic 108hp Lycoming O-235 with auto gas STC. I'd say it was every bit as safe as any other light single engine airplane, so long as you pay close attention when the wheels are touching ground and mind your density altitude.

In some sense it felt safer than the 172 because I could fly a higher, tighter pattern. It was easier to lose a bunch of altitude on final by putting it sideways in an aggressive slip. The 172's small rudder didn't let it get as sideways, so it was a little more constrained. The 172 did have functioning instruments and dual radios, not just a handheld. It also had flaps. I think it was probably 10-15yr newer? Still a relatively "old" airframe. I probably had 5x or more as many hours in the Clipper so all that could just be biased towards familiarity.

Point being, old plane does not mean unsafe plane. It's not like you're riding around in some rusted out hooptie in the sky. There are rigorous mandatory inspections and maintenance schedules for every single component, which results in mechanical failures being really rare even in aircraft that are nearly 100 years old.

None of that obviates the need to know what you're doing, of course. The pilot in command needs to have control of the plane. I'm pretty skeptical of systems that kind of try to smooth over that sharp edge, I can understand the altruistic motivation behind it, but there's likely a side effect of reducing the perceived risk. That's a problem, because it makes people complacent. So in terms of overall safety, it might not be a win? You're trading on average higher complacency and lower situational awareness for maybe some better outcomes in rare situations? Probably not the best trade.

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That stuff just seems awfully gimmicky to me. I'm glad it worked and saved some lives. I don't think I'd want that system in my plane, though. I just wouldn't be able to trust it.

But I also wouldn't want anything to do with the new glass cockpit stuff, way too easy to just lose all your instruments at once. I'll take properly maintained, independent mechanical or electromechanical systems over digital ones every time for things that actually need to work.

Digital systems always seem to accumulate tons of complexity ("features") rendering them extremely brittle. Until we can figure out how to stop doing that, I prefer to avoid depending too heavily on them for important stuff.

The Cirrus parachute system seems pretty simple and trustworthy, that approach feels more directionally correct. Not much more complex than an automotive airbag.

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> It's probably about right to compare the risk profile to motorcycle riding.

I'd say it's probably not, many motorcycle riders deliberately choose a motorcycle because it's "fun", meaning they go around speeding on purpose, so the crash stats are very negatively skewed by those deliberately behaving recklessly, just how driving crash stats are skewed by people driving under the influence.

That's a bit of a different approach than to flying a plane, and yet GA is super dangerous. That's because unlike motorcycling, flying is inherently unsafe, there's no "just stop" option if you have an issue. The default is crashing. The only reason commercial aviation is so safe is the incredible effort that's been put into engineering safety systems at thousands of layers, from mechanical to human factors, but hardly any of that applies to GA.

So IMO, if you ride as responsibly as you fly, riding should be way safer.

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There are classes of motorcycle accidents that are not a function of rider speeding or otherwise being careless. The one that took the life of a coworker is described as follows: the motorcycle is travelling on a country two-lane road, trees alongside, sunny day, and a vehicle comes from the other direction and turns left across the path of the motorcycle. At closing speed over 160 kph (80- 100 kph in opposite directions) the gap is closing at over 45 m/s and dappled lighting makes it hard to see the motorcycle even with a daytime headlight. Years after my friend's death I read a chapter in a book on forensic engineering which covered the situation in detail (not my coworker's death specifically, but this class of motorcycle accident as a recognized pattern).
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There's also the out-of-cockpit pressure from both the patient needing medical transport, and the employer who may retaliate against a pilot who refuses to fly. Apparently most of these pilots are trying to build 1500 hrs to be eligible to fly for the airlines, so they are feeling pressured from that angle too.
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> Apparently most of these pilots are trying to build 1500 hrs to be eligible to fly for the airlines, so they are feeling pressured from that angle too.

Fixed wing, maybe, I'm not familiar, but around here, I know most of the pilots for the two HEMS agencies (I used to be a paramedic). HEMS is considered the most lucrative of the post-military pilot careers for rotary. You fly high end machines, in all sorts of scenarios, and see all manner of things.

And as it is, often times fixed-wing EMS doesn't actually fly that often. Long range transport that can't go ground (and providers and insurers will go to some lengths, depending on the patient - one employer of mine was contracted for a ground transport from Seattle to Las Vegas).

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I've been in this situation too. But I was trained for it and had a mental checklist to follow. I never had a GPS, though. It seems from the details of the article, which you rightly highlighted, that the pilots were using their GPS as a crutch and had no ability to fall back on basic dead reckoning. It seems they didn't know where they were. That's pretty inexcusable, like embarrassing even.

I don't fly anymore, but I see similar behaviors developing on the water. People who use chartplotters for navigation don't have a very good understanding of what's going on around them. If you're just interactively following a computed lay line or a plotted course you don't really need to know what the currents are doing. You don't need to know what the hazards are. You're not actively engaged in navigating the boat.

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They deferred navigation to ATC instead of using their own capabilities such as VOR.
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They requested navigation assistance ATC could not promptly provide. I strongly agree the pilot in command could've done better, but if ATC was overloaded, they should've promptly communicated that to manage expectations that immediate help was not forthcoming. An aircraft covers a lot of ground "in a couple of minutes." (assuming ~120-200 knots)

https://www.airresearch.com/Pilots/AIM-08/Chap6/aim0602.html

> a. Radar equipped ATC facilities can provide radar assistance and navigation service (vectors) to VFR aircraft in difficulty when the pilot can talk with the controller, and the aircraft is within radar coverage. Pilots should clearly understand that authorization to proceed in accordance with such radar navigational assistance does not constitute authorization for the pilot to violate CFRs. In effect, assistance is provided on the basis that navigational guidance information is advisory in nature, and the responsibility for flying the aircraft safely remains with the pilot.

Potentially tangentially related to an overloaded and understaffed US ATC network, similar to the overloaded controller that led to the LaGuardia runway incursion on March 22, 2026.

https://www.pilotsofamerica.com/community/threads/crj-collid... ("What’s the bet that the controller had been overworked and the cab was understaffed? Seems to be an incredibly common thread lately.")

American aviation is near collapse? - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47494469 - March 2026 (106 comments)

LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47503965 - March 2026 (310 comments)

Two pilots dead after plane and ground vehicle collide at LaGuardia - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47486386 - March 2026 (667 comments)

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47494936 (my comment with citations on this thesis)

(my flavor of autism includes aggressive pattern matching)

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>(my flavor of autism includes aggressive pattern matching)

This gave me a smile. I've never heard of pattern matching being described as aggressive.

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