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I have the same question as GP. Your answer helps a little but not really. I might be naive, but I was under the impression that malicious code escaping a docker image and running amok on my host system was not something I should be too worried about. Especially if I run docker in rootless mode. Is that wrong?

For clarity I’m actually using podman, not Docker.

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Oh no, you should definitely be worried about that. Podman might make it harder to escalate to host root, or manipulate other containers, but it is still vulnerable.

Now I'm curious to know how hardened the Docket Sandbox orchestration interface is. I guess we can assume they have run Mythos against it for a few weeks maybe? It's unclear.

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Unsettling. I mean, is there any reasonable way to develop software in 2026? I've already sworn off ever installing npm directly on my host. Containerizing everything is laborious enough, but running a separate VM for everything?
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You just need to work out the threat model for what you're working on. For trusted containerized workloads, where the attack surface is minimal, just containerization is fine. However, agents can do just about anything on your computer if you allow it and people aren't really shying away from `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so better hardening (VMs, microVMs) is desirable.
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BS.

Unless we're talking 0-day/CVE, running an unprivileged container is as trustable as a VM. The only difference is how strictly you want to hold the memory/CPU bar. Infact on linux, containers are more lightweight than VMs.

So yeah, not "vulnerable".

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When the host is a Mac or window , docker always run in a VM anyway.

On Linux, you can run docker directly on the host, but you can also very easily setup a vm with incus and run docker from there.

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That depends on the runtime though. For example, libkrun lets you do this:

    docker run --runtime krun hello-world
That starts/runs the OCI in a qemu microvm.
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