Sure you do; you just don’t want the crate to be made available to people trying to make use of the crate as regular downstream consumers. You still want the crate available for download for analysis. You especially want to be able to deterministically reproduce the vulnerable version of your software that you already built.
I would posit that most package ecosystems should treat “contains an exploit” as its own package state; mostly ignore them; but still be aware of their existence.
In other words, if there’s any other non-exploited option under your version constraints, the dep should resolve to the nearest non-exploited version, even if older. But if it’s the only version, or if you have pinned the exploited version, then the packager should see it, but normally refuse to interact with it—i.e. refuse to lock to it if it’s the only version; or refuse to fetch it if it’s the locked version.
I say “normally” because you should be able to bypass this with a flag / env-var to the packager that basically means “I’m building this for forensic analysis, not for running.”
I don't mind malware being lumped in to that - the place to look up code for historical or analysis reasons ought to be version control, not crates.io
The build infrastructure should make security incidents easier to respond to, not harder. I shouldn't be sent on a wild goose chase at a time when I'm potentially already dealing with a major incident. The tools need to "just work".