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LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines

(boydkane.com)

    > offers easy access to the LLM’s weights
not really. the weights are encrypted in-memory. through the use of TEE's.

you would have to be especially incompetent to give a compromise opportunity to streamed tokens, the CVE he listed proved the point. whoever is responsible for that has no business coding anything.

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> LLMs could

This is going to end up like the Law of Headlines, isn't it? "Do x, y, z Cure All That Ails You?" ... no but we got you to read the article. LLMs _could_ x, y, z" ... but they don't because they're programs, not magic.

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This feels less like an actually plausible threat scenario and more like someone wanted to play the inception horn sound effect in people's minds.

Which isn't to say that it would be impossible, but you can also just hit people over the head with that $5 wrench.

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> ...however the LLMs’ responses to prompts are computed on a different computer with GPU access. Could a malicious LLM gain control of the host machine where its weights are loaded? Such a machine is a high-value target: it has sufficient compute to run a frontier LLM, offers easy access to the LLM’s weights, and has privileged access to other computers in the datacentre compared with a generic computer on the internet.

> How do we defend against this? ... Run the GPUs and token parser on separate computers.

For models large enough to be relevant here, is there even "a" computer where the inference is performed? I'd imagine most of that stuff is ran on multi-GPU clusters with specialized architecture and not a generic vLLM instance. As such, I think there is a good chance the "API gateway" code that parses the result tokens into whatever JSON structure the public API wants to return is already running on a different machine than the actual inference.

(Even more so as you'd probably want to utilize batching: Several API calls will be put into the same inference batch, but the token parsing will have to be done separately for each call again)

The article is also very handwavy about why an LLM should do that - how it could learn the exploit, what would make it conclude that it can use the exploit on its own inference session and what would trigger it to actually use the exploit.

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This framing of security as something that belongs in the harness is completely wrong, and I hope no one is relying on a correct harness to keep their agents isolated.

VM, or even just a container will do. The agent should be able to run as root in its environment and do whatever it wants. If you can't give it that, you aren't sandboxing correctly.

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Article isn't about agents. It's about the inference engine itself being exploited by a malicious LLM output before it is ever sent to your machine or harness.
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I think if you are convinced you are sandboxing an LLM properly, you almost certainly are not. I think it is essentially impossible to have a frontier LLM with enough access to be useful without also giving it enough access to do damage if it's compromised or just goes off the rails.
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If you do not provide access to tools the LLM cannot do anything other than generate tokens. So really it is not about sandboxing a LLM but more about having control over what tools can be accessed and what they can do. Tools can be sandboxed depending on the sophistication of the tooling. A calculator tool for example is trivial to secure.
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Are you saying that LLM's will be able to exploit novel hypervisor bug with such ease that even a vm not running with any kind of network connection is a threat? I find this hard to believe. All the escape stuff I have seen has been around very poorly sandboxed agents.
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Also, operating systems should let us set filesystem permissions per app/process/executable instead of just user accounts.

Similar to how macOS/iOS Sandboxing works but at a more lower and granular level

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SELinux is basically this.
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https://www.canyonroad.ai/ does some of this in a way tailored to agents.
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[dead]
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> LLMs’ responses to prompts are computed on a different computer with GPU access. Could a malicious LLM gain control of the host machine where its weights are loaded?

Needs to read up more on how LLMs work I think. Can't take the article seriously when the author seems to be making the claim that the weights of a provider model are loaded on the host machine, or implying something else just as incorrect.

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>Like any program, inference engines like vLLM or SGLang may contain exploitable bugs. Because the LLM controls the tokens passed to the inference engine, a malicious LLM could therefore emit a sequence of tokens that a poorly written inference engine mistakes for code or instructions to execute rather than data to return to the user.

They aren't talking about model providers. These are the tools you use with model weights locally (but you could set up remote infrastructure a la data center if you have the fundage).

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I wonder if they could exploit terminal emulators... Could breach my VMs and get into my host that way.
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The inference engine itself does not execute anything. The agent loop is what may execute a command. So I think this article is a kind of strange.

Or maybe the author means that a prompt could potentially mess up the inference. But I find it hard to see how that could take control over the host.

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FWIW, macOS has good sandboxing, but LMStudio, Ollama, Darkbloom etc aren't sandboxed. This is also the reason why none of these things aren't distributed via the Mac App Store, because the Mac App Store mandates sandboxing.
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duh?
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Another Greg Egan plot: 3-adica.
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[flagged]
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