that haven't been true since pixel 4. it just picks your phone in the background.
replya burner sim, like a literal criminal, is the only way today.
Even with a burner sim, there is the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, which is tied to the phone, and is known to all apps with the android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE permission.
replyThat can't be true? <https://grapheneos.org/faq#hardware-identifiers>
reply As of Android 10, apps cannot obtain permission to access non-resettable hardware identifiers such as the serial number, MAC addresses, IMEIs/MEIDs, SIM card serial numbers and subscriber IDs. Only privileged apps included in the base system with READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE whitelisted can access these hardware identifiers. Apps targeting Android 10 will receive a SecurityException and older apps will receive an empty value for compatibility. The currently enabled carrier-based messaging app for SMS/MMS/RCS is a special case that's given access to certain device identifiers including the IMEI. This is normally the GrapheneOS fork of AOSP Messaging but can be changed to another app by the user.
Since these restrictions became standard, GrapheneOS only makes a small change to remove a legacy form of access to the serial number by legacy apps, which was still around for compatibility. It used to need more extensive changes such as disallowing access to the serial number but those restrictions are now standard.
I couldn't immediately find whether GrapheneOS grants READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE to Google Play. It might very well be that the GrapheneOS sandbox spoofs a fake IMEI, and I do hope so.
replyIn any case, my parent comment was meant for stock Pixels, as mentioned by armadyl further up in this thread.
https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play
reply> Google Play receives absolutely no special access or privileges on GrapheneOS as opposed to bypassing the app sandbox and receiving a massive amount of highly privileged access.
It doesn't mention IMEI here, but hopefully READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE is included in "privileged access."
There is an AppStore app, I am not sure if this is the one we are talking about? <https://github.com/GrapheneOS/AppStore/blob/main/app/src/mai...>
replyThat one lists:
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
ENFORCE_UPDATE_OWNERSHIP
FOREGROUND_SERVICE
FOREGROUND_SERVICE_SPECIAL_USE
INSTALL_PACKAGES
INTERNET
POST_NOTIFICATIONS
QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
REQUEST_DELETE_PACKAGES
REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES
UPDATE_PACKAGES_WITHOUT_USER_ACTIONThat's grapheneos's own app, separate from the play store or play services.
replyTrue. I think this one is closer to the truth: <https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsComp...>
replyThere is no READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE mentioned there.
That's also incorrect, because the gmscompat app is just a helper app. Play services can and does request additional permissions. Those permissions are handled by the OS under the play services app, not gmscompat. If you want RCS for instance, you must grant play services and google messages phone and ICC auth access, which isn't seen in gmscompat at all.
reply > That's also incorrect, because the gmscompat app is just a helper app.
> Those permissions are handled by the OS under the play services app
EDIT: "GmsCompatConfig is the text-based configuration for the GrapheneOS sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer. It provides a large portion of the compatibility shims." [1] This seems to indicate that the permissions requested by Play Services are being honored with the shims from the helper app. That would alleviate the permission problem.
1. https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsComp...
That's the application software side. I would assume the IMEI and IMSI are both going out to the cell network though, and I would presume that it's trivial to tie a phone number to those with how the mobile industry generally sells subscriber data to various data brokers. The only question is how permissive those data brokers are (their major constraint is how much most people become aware of this dynamic), but when dealing with a major APT like Google I'd assume they're tuned into the best ones with songs about bona fide purposes.
replyAre you talking about the US here? I am hoping this would be off-limits in Europe.
replyYes I am talking with a US perspective. I would hope the GDPR would prevent such things in (most of) Europe. But I also personally wouldn't assume so given that there are still the same dynamics of keeping the info flows private to avoid scrutiny, and claiming plausible "legitimate purposes" and "consent".
replyIts possible to set up a phone with a google account without even a sim card in it and use it as a wifi only device, so Im pretty sure what your saying is wrong.
replyassuming the number you get hasn't previously been assigned to a google account
replyI've had no end of trouble registering an account on our corporate SIMs as the phone numbers (not the actual SIM cards) had been recycled as employees leave.
replySo many systems cannot handle known pattern of a phone number changing. Who's decided these are imutable values? That I have only one? That it's not shared?
replyIt still works without a SIM card, how do you explain that?
reply