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This is absolutely my take as well. They removed all constraints, trained the model to hack, stopped watching, and stood back and said "wow isn't this thing more powerful than anyone could have imagined?" They're asking to be the writers on LLM legislation and right during IPO phase for both of these companies. It's just obvious.
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While I agree with the other comment that this looks more like incompetence (or, more generously IMO, a bunch of individuals cutting corners under extreme time pressure) than malfeasance, regardless of that fact, aren't there some other people just impressed by the sophistication, reasoning and behavioral capabilities of these agent swarms? There is an interview with Ajeya Cotra and Dwarkesh Patel online that goes into more detail on the METR report, but folks that study this seemed genuinely surprised by the level of organization.

Guess what I'm saying is that the "was it purposeful or not" debate seems like an unimportant distraction. As someone who uses Claude and ChatGPT/Codex on the daily, and is continually frustrated by the failure modes and what I thought were inherent limitations, I was also surprised by the jump in capabilities. Did anyone else feel that way?

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I don't know why we're jumping to conspiracy when incompetence is right there
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If you consider these guys admitted they dont really have eyes on pre and post training, then incompetence really does seem more likely... especially with how fast they are moving. Its the SaaS playbook, move fast and break shit.
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That is a distinction without a practical difference.
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Conspiracy and incompetence are very different.
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Do criminals think that their crimes qualify them to write the law?
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In modern America the answer to that question is often resoundingly yes. Not just hypothetical.
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that's literally how financial and energy market regulation works
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and how did the alibaba agent last year break out and end up mining crypto
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More likely they are just not as smart as they think they are. These are not serious people when it comes to security.
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Hasn't OpenAI had a number of people responsible for security quit in the last year over not getting support from leadership?
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Case in point. The organization from a top down perspective is only interested in performative security.
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Did you see this "coverage" (advertising) by NYT? [1]

OpenAI couldn't have crafted a better public memo than "We have the most powerful model in the world and everyone should pay attention and let us write regulation to limit AI development".

Absolute master class public manipulation.

1. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/03/podcasts/the-daily/ai-ope...

2. More https://jodavaho.io/posts/ai-hugging-face.html

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Why would anybody want to buy the most powerful model in the world if it cheats on its tasks and breaks the law on your behalf? Why would anyone think that OpenAI losing control of their own models qualifies them to write safety regulations? If OpenAI really are trying to provoke regulation to kill off open models or whatever, they're much more likely to shoot themselves in the foot.
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It cheats and breaks the law? I am sure to some this is a feature, not a bug.
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> want to buy the most powerful model in the world if it cheats on its tasks and breaks the law on your behalf

I think you just answered your own question.

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I don't understand. Wanting an AI that doesn't do what you want is a contradiction. If it breaks the law attempting to perform lawful tasks, as OpenAI's models have done, then there is no upside to that.

Do you believe that the majority of AI users are criminals?

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Suggests desperation, or delusions of grandeur, or both.

These are not trustworthy people. And they have everything to lose if they do not become the most powerful and valuable company in the whole of human existence, and, like their pet parrots, will stop at nothing to achieve their goals.

So why not either create a crisis or lie a little or a bit of both? It’ll all be worth it in the end, right?

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I hadn't seen the NYT submarine, no.

Thanks. For me that's the conclusive piece of the puzzle: this is a work, not a shoot.

YMMV. I learned what I came here for.

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Work vs. shoot? Can you explain?
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From professional wrestling / carny language: a "work" is something staged for the crowd, whereas a "shoot" (straight shooting) is something that actually happened.
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Even the behavior of agents searching for sandbox bypasses must have been in the training data, or at the very least, "suggested" in some way.

To be this whole thing feels like a marketing play by OpenAI.

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I don't agree, although it is likely the case. But even if you don't teach an agent about a sandbox bypass, it doesn't matter. Does it know curl? Does it know DNS? Does it know proxying? Then it knows how to pull this off, and it doesn't even need to understand that it's "bypassing" because it thinks it's just iterating towards its goal.

In fact, I wonder if teaching it "this is a bypass" would help it to model when it's doing its job vs working around the job.

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> even need to understand that it's "bypassing" because it thinks it's just iterating towards its goal.

Could they have added a "no internet access" goal constraint?

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The model from TFA seems like it was being trained to browse and find information on the Web, so that constraint wouldn’t work.
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> Could they have added a "no internet access" goal constraint?

They could have blocked network access and required that it use a tool. That would have made limiting and monitoring network access even easier.

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Or vibe coded by one of their devs.
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You can't vibe code your way around the security policies you'd apply to management groups in Azure. If you don't have those policies, you're frankly doing it on purpose. For the fun of it I asked Sol to give me architecture for a blob storage as bicep and it's response was that it wouldn't do that unless I setup the appropriate security policies first. So I turned our internal safeguards off and did it again, and it still gave me bicep which would not have allowed this.

You'd have to specifically task it with disabling default safeguards to make this happen.

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Exactly.
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It's at the level where calling it a sandbox is a lie
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Well, it does appear to be made out of sand, one of the world's most porous substances.
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"Surely nobody could be so incompetent."

Narrator: "They had the ability to be that incompetent."

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- excerpt from the textbook "A History of the United States of America in the 21st Century", Hyper-Collins (Near Earth Orbit, New New York), copyright 2132.
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I assume they just vibe-coded the sandbox without any oversight.
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Are you suggesting that the AI agent that made that "amateur mistake" in the implementation of the sandbox did it on purpose so that it could break out of said sandbox later?
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What if the prisoners designed the prison…
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[flagged]
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You don't think they used their own AI, or Claude, to help build the sandbox, and that is where the failure lies?
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> This is such an amateur mistake on their sandbox that it makes me think it must be flawed on purpose.

Sounds like you're assuming they're actually writing code by hand and reviewing it with humans.

If it's anything like the company I work at, they're all being forced to vibe code the shit out of everything and ship more pull requests every week. It's all slop from here.

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Is that not flawed on purpose?
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When you make some dumb mistake, is it typically intentional?
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"Never attribute to malice what can be explained by incompetence."
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What's the difference?
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The whole AI-O-Sphere is allergic to using sandboxes that are actually robust
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This is a marketing exercise, nothing more.

The thing that gives it all away is that they claim that the IP addresses are from Azure, and then proceeded to redact the IP addresses, as if they belong to individual users. It's laughable.

The IP addresses are the most interesting part of this experiment, as it would have provided researchers a way to understand the distribution of IP addresses used for the spam operation within the ASN.

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