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I don't think there's any company with useful information on the American public that isn't being forced to regularly hand over that data. That's probably been true to some extent for a long time (see Room 641A) but it's certainly gotten worse. At this point you can't check out a book from the library without the feds demanding that your librarian turn over a list of everything you've ever read, or rent a hotel room for a night without the hotel being forced to provide your information to the government.

Use an online service that's new enough and small enough and it might not be compromised, but the moment it gets popular men with guns and national security letters with gag orders will show up to install hardware on their prem, take over entire offices, or just demand reports.

VPNs and secure DNS services aren't there to keep your data from the NSA, ICE, or even the police. They are useful for keeping your ISP from selling your browsing history to anyone willing to pay them (https://www.mitnicksecurity.com/in-the-news/republicans-just...). It'll help keep a little of what you do online away from data brokers, keep your ISP from sending you DMCA notices, and not much else.

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For clarification, this is completely true of the US, without needing to speculate, thanks to a combination of FISA 702, the ECPA, CALEA, EO 12333, and the CLOUD act. It all has legal footing in the States.

However, it's not at all the reality of a vast swath of other countries (or, at least, not yet; see Chat Control v2). The US is particularly foul (and effective) when it comes to this practice, but anything outside of US jurisdiction that doesn't have an office in the US can't be touched by laws like these, and the laws of most other countries tend to be significantly less invasive than American ones when it comes to data interception and the practices surrounding it.

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> and what currently would prevent them from doing so if they haven't already

they arent gods. some people actually have moral standards and dont just do whatever a foreign agency wants them to do

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Adversaries don't always ask nicely. Sometimes they break in and silently take the data. These services centralize traffic flows and make it so that an adversary only needs to tap one or two circuits to get a full picture for all users of a service.
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CIA is not stupid enough to break into a guarded data center in Switzerland or one of the less America friendly EU countries. They tell the NSA to look for security holes and spread narratives that only criminals use VPN hoping that a politician will notice and try to ban them, like what's happening in the UK.

Big tech services are less private than you think but almost every provider who cares about privacy is safer than you expect. Most of the people who work there are committed to their mission, and if they ever get a gag order someone will leak it in no time because they know exactly how to do it without exposing their identity.

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Are you sure? Someone broke into a Hetzner data center and a Linode one, physically intercepted the Ethernet cables for jabber.ru, and got certificates signed on their behalf.

https://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37961166

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Why would they serve a secret subpoena and gag order, when instead they can just drive to a secluded location 5km away from the super secure datacenter, dig a few meters down, passively tap a strand or two, facility and service operators none the wiser?
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They’ve already done both. When they can get a cooperative party (AT&T, for example), they colocate their splitter equipment. When they can’t, they tap undersea and overland cables.

When it’s a hostile environment entirely, they hack and do secret operations and bribe.

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The data would/should be encrypted; while the NSA did successfully tap Google's inter-datacenter traffic before the Snowden leaks, since then it is encrypted, too. Hopefully other providers won't fall for that trick anymore, either.
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IIRC, Google addressed the incident you're referring to by adding E2E encryption to sensitive inter-DC RPC sessions, rather than by fully encrypting inter-DC traffic at the link level. It would be nice to be able to reasonably expect carrier/ISP backbones to be secure against this threat, but in our actual reality this seems like fantastical thinking.
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