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All of your blocking still doesn't change the fact that your LG TV is actively trying to scan your local hardware, gathering IP-addresses of devices, wi-fi names and signal strengths, creating digital finger prints of the audio and video projected on your screen, recording audio through the internal microphone, even when the TV is in standby or without an internet connection, saving the collected data locally and uploading to LG Ad Solutions as soon as the TV is connected to the internet.
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But it's never connected to the internet, not even for software updates. If the TV isn't connected to the internet there's no reason to update it, assuming the TV works as expected.

It's a trade off I guess. I use Home Assistant to control TVs, so kinda need the access.

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Again, what I mean is, even if you're able to block all these things, the company LG is still secretly and actively trying to collect and process user data, without user awareness or consent.
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Yeah which is why its imperative that you _never_ connect to the Internet.
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Do transparent faraday cages exist?
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If you're streaming via AppleTV, why do you need to give the TV itself access to the network?
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There is sadly no hdmi CEC support on Most GPUs for pcs. So when you want your tv to turn on and off with your pc it is only possible with the tv being reachable from your pc via ip.

I believe LG doesn’t advertise such an api via Bluetooth

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I use Home Assistant to turn on/off the TV via automations, sensors, etc.

I could possibly do it via HDMI CEC, but I have a couple of Sony Bravia TVs that more often than not completely ignores that, so I prefer having control over assuming it happens.

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And then your neighbor spins up an unprotected network or something like xfinity which they could have a deal with and it connects there and phones home anyways.
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And what exactly would they use that particular access path for ?

I could see a threat if the TV had access to the internet and could establish a TLS tunnel or similar from the mothership, and execute commands on my LAN (or IoT network as it stands), and report back. That could establish a command & control channel that could potentially orchestrate an attack on my infrastructure via the TV.

However, reporting that "network X exists and has these devices" over a different network complicates things a fair bit. In theory they could still use the TV as a command and control platform, but it would have to switch networks between my closed network and the open network in order to execute commands and report results. Not saying it's impossible, just very unlikely.

Besides, the TVs are not alone in being cut off from the internet. I have two IoT networks, one for trusted devices (AppleTVs, Sonos, and the likes), and one for untrusted devices like TVs. They run on different VLANs, and anything on the untrusted IoT network can pretty much only talk to itself (client isolation) and the gateway, and there's no internet and no open ports to any other VLAN.

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> And what exactly would they use that particular access path for ?

Uploading the weeks, months, or years of locally-stored activity [0] data? Text compresses really well and local storage used to be very cheap.

[0] ...mic voice transcription, how often you use the thing, for how long, and a best guess (because of lack of time sync) at when, "automated content detection" logs [1], names of files you've fed to the thing, -if equipped with a camera- number of people in a room and interesting information about them, etc, etc, etc...

[1] ...assuming that that can be done with data loaded from the factory, which I kinda doubt...

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