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Can't I just point my camera at an AI generated image? And it will get the stamp of authenticity?
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It would be great if they could use the LiDAR scanner to sign a depth map of the scene in front of the camera. It would show if you photographed a flat image.
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The sensor already uses phase detection autofocus. You can create a depth map out of it. iPhone X used its dual cameras and that phase data for depth maps.
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They could use the camera aperture to take a second photo and calculate blur.
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If that became popular, the AIs would learn how to generate a realistic depth map along with any generated image.
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How would that work? I thought the premise here is that you can fool the apple camera by taking a (very carefully aligned) picture of a still image (printed out).

A depth map from the apple camera (again, signed) would show that the entire image had the same distance from the camera.

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You're right. I think my comment above doesn't make sense - it wouldn't help in this case.
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The photos are cryptographically signed in the apple image pipeline so it's not as simple as just AI generating something. That said, I can't see how this is any different to all the other times we have embedded crypto keys in consumer hardware where eventually someone finds a way to extract the key and the whole thing is busted open.
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Given the whole private cloud bit, I am assuming they keep the private keys server side and never let them out.
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I think there's a chain of trust. The sensor signs raws, and the private cloud takes signed raws, does minimal processing so they're at least coherent, and re signs that output (maybe even including the original signed raw as well in the image file).
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How would the server know that the request is coming from a real iPhone?

This is a pretty standard application of trusted computing and can be done entirely on the iPhone. A server would only possibly be needed for anonymization (while retaining key revocation capabilities if a key does end up leaking), but there are serverless ways to do even that (TPMs have supported these for a while now).

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It wouldn't, but you could validate that a particular picture was created at a particular time, and had not changed, for example, especially with metadata that you may not want to share but that establishes certain parameters like gps coordinates. A lock, rather than an end-to-end pixel signature, which shows what was contemporaneous rather than exact provenance. If an event happened on day 0000-00-00 00:00:00am, but your photo was taken at some other time, it casts doubt.

I think a big part of validation for things like these are just "could it have been modified since Z event happened", because Z was not something people paid attention to before.

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That's a good point, You might still be able to trick the cloud to sign your photos, but that's something they could patch in updates without losing control of the key. They could have the server only sign photos taken on the latest ios version.
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And honestly you could have a similar antitampering oracle that was at least obscured, in terms of "we've detected tampering but won't tell you how or why", which is frustrating but I have to imagine that 99.9%+ of images are clean.
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Even simpler, a 3D printed relief with an image "stamped" on it, now you effectively have a 3D image.
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…and the PDAF data will show how shallow it is.
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... don't make it so shallow then. Perfectly possible in a consumer-friendly 3D printer for a face or even human body if you have lots of time for the prints.
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You’re well on the way to 1:1 replicas at this point. Next you’ll need to match the thermal signature and the exact weather in the sky for the time at that location.
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Sounds like Rincewind's spell from the Octavo.
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Then take and sign a one-second video and you’re adding a few orders of magnitude of complexity again.
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but what are we really trying to solve here. you're suggesting a helluvalota work for what purpose?
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The 'ol "analog hole". Never been able to patch that gap.
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Yes, if your adversary can generate a high-fidelity 3D moving replica of a scene, they can deceive you that it’s real. But can they really?
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And what if you take a picture across a IR-filtered window?
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Then you won’t be able to prove it was a genuine photograph? That sounds like the right failure mode.
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That's a cool idea.
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Pretty sure it does that already.
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One can 3d-print the AI generated image and photograph that. /s
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that's an authentic photo, not the subject/image, the photo is authentic.
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It will look like you took a picture of a screen or print out
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People have constructed video walls so high resolution they can film TV series in front of them and to an audience it's indistinguishable from a real set. It's extremely cost-effective for things like space fantasy that needs lots of exotic-looking backdrops, apparently.

It may not be in reach for you and I - but within reach of anyone with the budget to run a 'bot farm'

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The high resolution video wall is quite simple. The hard part and why this has not been done earlier is that for filming, they had to synchronize the rendered background with the movement of the camera.
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Movement is solved by tracking the camera's position and projecting the background from there.

Proof of captured image with hardware-based-attestation can be increased by adding extra information besides the RGB channels, like depth mapping (which a projected screen wouldn't be able to fake), and eventually light field recording (plenoptic imaging, e.g. Lytro).

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also no, even in the high rez video walls its still possible to tell. maybe to an "audience" no but there are lots of fundamental flaws with video walls that make them not the same as filming it for real. all of those flaws show up in the final image and could be detected.

things like color rendering, sharpness, screen door/morie, motion blur, and yup even good ole depth queues in the lens system all show up as artifacts.

case in point, outside of a few specific niche cases like the mandalorian, that virtual production video wall thing is not actually being used all that much because of the amount of post shoot cleanup required to fix all those issues, it wasnt actually that much cheaper and its not really better either. especially when you factor in how hard it is to shoot that way.

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> things like color rendering, sharpness, screen door/morie, motion blur, and yup even good ole depth queues in the lens system all show up as artifacts.

Pre-AI fake videos sidestep this sort of issue by lowering the video quality.

Add some motion blur, some camera shake, some poor lighting, the camera being slightly out of focus, and make the video 720p instead of 4k.

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If they’re spending millions on faking an image, okay fine. That’s clearly not the security model intended for this feature though.
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How large and pixel dense does a display need to be for it to convincingly fill an image sensor?

I suspect it’s significantly less than millions.

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Stamp only proves you did the photo and probably some metadata like when where etc.

It helps but doesn't solve credibility issue.

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The credibility comes from who took the photo. The next logical and easy step is for this metadata to flow to the user agent. I'll know that it was taken by a legit journalist photographer. And id not, I can have my user agent make it fuzzy or replaced with a kitten photo.
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I think this is where we are headed. This feature seems useless on it's own since someone will eventually find a way to extract the key from the iphone and sign any image. But if they could make it so every iphone uses it's own key and the photos show "Taken by xyz" and it's linked to their icloud or identity somehow. That way images shared around will still be able to be linked to a source that you can choose to trust and the viewer can know it wasn't modified from what that person shot.

Then we might move to an age where photos which were not signed by someone will be treated as fake.

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You may have forgotten that the world is driven by screenshots, and so a screenshot of a picture with the `(X) Verified by Apple to be Joe Schmoe` tacked on will be just as good as real verification for a lot of people.

What we need is almost something like the classic "press C+A+D to log in" or the idea of "above the browser pane"... something an image cannot show you unless it's legit. Perhaps a personal thumbprint icon that is different for each viewer, so you know its your device telling you that something is real and not just some mock fake thing?

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I don't think we'll treat them as fake but they would probably undergo more scrutiny - perhaps in a crowd-sourced manner that provides an overall score of probable legitimacy.
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Phones all have hardware security modules with keys stored inside. That will absolutely be in use for this new feature.
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You actually think the Secure Enclave is useless.
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Right. All of your pictures will include identifying information. Same will happen for LLM generated text.
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what is it missing then?
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I bet there exists data from the 3 cameras to represent some depth to the image.
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> Users can now prove the authenticity of a photo taken on iPhone 18 Pro models with Apple Reference Image, powered by the new sensor in the Main camera that can sign every pixel it sees.

Will this also work with third-party camera apps like ProCam?

https://www.procamapp.com/

https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/procam-5/id6787737491?mt=8

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> I love that it has a feature to prove images came from the real world

Congrats to Apple achieving nation-wide tracking, embedding some kind of yellow dots[1], but this time this time this is based on strong cryptography and non-removable, targeting people who don't use AI under the slogan "we are fighting AI fakes", but people still "love the feature".

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printer_tracking_dots

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Are the yellow dots not opt in?
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If you have a colour laser printer, not only are the tracking dots not opt in, but there is no way to opt out.
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I meant the metaphorical iphone ones
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On the opposite side, this read to me like there was so much image processing going on in the background and off device that they felt like they needed to prove that there was a real image backing the creation, and that it was not all AI. It really begs the question of what the extent is of image processing.
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The iphone image pipeline is mostly just playing with exposure and color, things that we widely regard as fair game in editing. Where the line was crossed was magic eraser and reframe where the iphone is straight up making objects in the image.
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there is definitely some generative pixel stuff in the iOS pipeline as i've noticed garbled deepdream-esque letters when zooming before
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That could be a result of a failed exposure stack. Phone sensors and lenses suck for light gathering so they have to take multiple photos and merge them together to create one that's less noisy. Occasionally you get artifacts where the merge failed.

It's still distinct from actual AI generation imo.

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Yes, this is really a "Pro" feature, while C2PA exists, not many consumer products have it, iPhone will be the game changer for reporters.
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Reporters who only capture pictures on an iPhone and not a "real" camera, and who also never need to edit the photo to crop off or obscure identifying information, innocent bystanders/victims, gory violence or nudity, etc...

The problem is real, but this solution seems to not really solve it in any practical sense.

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You want to do all that, then still can prove the picture is authentic. The editing history show what had been changed compare to the previous version, from the color adjustment to blur areas... it's not about preventing editing, it's about proving the authenticity when needed.
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Reporters who only capture pictures on an iPhone and not a "real" camera, and who also never need to edit the photo to crop off or obscure identifying information, innocent bystanders/victims, gory violence or nudity, etc...

So, 90% of photojournalism outside of the major cities, then.

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you could do edits like crops in a way that preserves the signature using ZK proofs
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The weakness of this is that a person can take a picture of a high resolution screen or print.

We really need Apple to open up true depth APIs to make forgery non trivial.

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I don’t know too much about image processing, but my intuition tells me that distinguishing a photo of a 3d scene from a photo of a photo of a 3d scene is a much easier engineering problem than distinguishing it from an AI-generated diffusion. So even just reducing the problem to the former is still a worthy accomplishment.
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Agree with the weakness, but the benefit of provenance is still there. You can't tell if the picture that person took is of an AI image, but there's some value in saying "I took this" and being able to prove it.
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I hope future social media presents this metadata so if someone claims a photo is from the BBC, it actually gets checked against the keys the BBC sign their photos with.
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How does this actually work though?

1) I see a photo online and doubt it's provenance

2) I contact the photographer and ask to see their cloud image (???!)

2a) I borrow someone's mac to download the image (.jpg?) and it can be verified on that?

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This feature is not enabled in the eu
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I wish next year for videos too.

We really need it for journalism. Otherwise we will not know what is real and what fabricated with ai.

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Canon's original high end digital models had this as a feature, that your images could be digitally signed in-camera based on raw sensor data. Primarily for law enforcement. Obviously a far broarder use case, now.
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So does that mean only the main sensor can do this ?
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That's more of a software feature..
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That smells like "show don't tell", but who knows.
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Feels like the only ones who'd benefit from this are AI companies that are afraid of tainting their post 2023 datasets with their own slop.

On the other hand if this becomes mandated by law I can see it become treacherous for endusers.

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It also sounds pretty useful for anyone involved in a lawsuit to be able to present photographic evidence again. I’m sure GenAI is already a big headache for forensics, and enforcing AI watermarks will clearly not be bulletproof.
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Will it ever work until a TPM like module is directly integrated into camera sensor? Older attempts of Nikon and Canon got broken, same had happened with C2PA implementation for Android - if it gets anywhere close to CPU it is insecure.
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Yes, presumably there will be a cat and mouse game until the entire system including all peripherals has been brought into the trusted computing base, either physically or logically (usually with secured/authenticated communication). This has been the case for all applications of trusted computing.

Security is never a binary property, however, and can usually be better expressed in terms of how expensive it would be to subvert a given mechanism. "This image is either authentic or would have cost at least $x to fake" is already much more useful than nothing at all even without $x trending to infinity.

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A mobile phone.. an internet communicator.. a music player.. don't you get it? well, steve, actually 18 years later it's a .. camera
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Cynical take: A single photo to now consume up 50mb of cloud storage, adding to the demand for more data centers that supported the creation of this authenticity issue in the first place.
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*Not available in EU or China.

I wonder what the common thread is.

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> I wonder what the common thread is.

Regulation.

For China I would assume like other services, if there's some cloud involved, it should be on Chinese soil and accessible to China.

For EU harder to guess, but again the lock-in with "Private Cloud Computing" feels related.

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It could be because a digital signature could be use to track without consent.
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Nah, it’s an optional feature, so by using it you provide express consent. GDPR gives users more data ownership; GDPR does not stop you from choosing to do what you want with your data.

It’s likely DMA — Apple would be required to provide APIs for signing for 3rd party apps too.

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Finally. Android phones have been shipping with C2PA since last year, so it's great that the final holdout has capitulated, though with its own set of nonstandard tools.

https://c2paviewer.com/articles/samsung-galaxy-s25-c2pa

https://security.googleblog.com/2025/09/pixel-android-truste...

https://c2paviewer.com/supported-devices

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The Android version is useless though, TBD if Apple can do better.

https://www.da.vidbuchanan.co.uk/blog/android-c2pa.html

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Indeed, on top of Google's implementation being a bad joke, it sounds like the C2PA specifications in general are a massive fail so far. https://arxiv.org/html/2604.24890v1

On the other hand, ignoring standards altogether is the wrong way to go because the ecosystem after capture won't be there.

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How will this work against rehosted images on all the platforms people actually share photos from? It’s a good feature but many popular services apply metadata stripping and basic image adjustment before resharing. That seems like the place where people would actually want to verify authenticity.
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It works for the author of the image who want to prove the authenticity, and the party that publishing the image who want to maintain the trust.
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