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DDS sort of took over from CORBA in the military domain, and the statically-typed IDL was still quite similar to CORBA last time I looked at it, so that takes you back to around 1998 when CORBA was being used a lot in the military in my experience.

What other protocols and systems were you thinking of that can provide (depending on broker) hard-realtime delivery that can be used in safety-critical systems?

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Stupid question, but why didn’t the DOD mandate IP compatibility for literally all comms like 20+ years ago? Is it pure corruption/incompetence or is there a good reason?
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A lot of military comms are point-to-point or broadcast between radios where TCP/IP doesn’t really make sense. On top of that, you need to understand how much legacy military networking stuff is out there. This stuff long predates the internet. We had tactical data links and target tracking where a ground station could receive a target info from a remote radar array, and automatically direct fighters on autopilot on an intercept course with enemy contacts in like 1960 (see SAGE as an example). These systems have been around for decades and been continually improved on. There’s a lot of inertia to maintain compatibility. Because you really don’t want someone to die because your ally tried to warn you but their tactical data link isn’t compatible with yours.
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I never said anything about mandating TCP too.
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TCP/IP refers to the whole protocol stack, including UDP. That is a bit counterintuitive, but well established: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_protocol_suite
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The DOD effectively can't "just mandate" things and it's because of politics (which is a superset of corruption and incompetence).

There's a very small number of major contractors and if you pick one of their APIs as the new standard, then you disadvantage all the others.

If you pick a greenfield project, then it will take a long time, and once you are done everybody will claim that they can't use it (see e.g. Ada; quick version they started working on a mandate for a programming language in 1975, mandated Ada in 1991 and by 1996 removed the Ada mandate).

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actual or perceived realtime / determinism requirements
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Every mil company designs unique bespoke things often with some exceptions, and even the "open systems" mostly aren't open by any stretch of the definition.

Obscurity is part of the allure, not a repulsive factor.

You don't want a hostile nation suddenly and easily understanding your systems.

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On the other hand, its good to design systems where it wouldn't even matter if the hostile nation state knows exactly how it works.

This is a principle in cryptography, but carries nicely to other things.

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I feel like this is always the best design whenever possible.
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Asterix is an actual standard for radar data, coming from civilian radar systems. I wish it was updated somehow for 3d beam-steered (and moving) sensors, but still it covers most of the industry's needs... I keep hearing so many grumblings of replacing it (it is binary, unforgiving, quirky, very 80s...) and of course fragmentation is back in.
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I have to assume that so many people require access to the specs that an interested party can surely acquire them.

World of Tanks has repeatedly had military personnel updating the technical specifications with details they have found in the secret manuals.

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Are you not thinking about the wrong tank game? World of tanks has ancient tanks, not modern (game tank span basically end with the main battle tank making the game tank role division being made irrelevant).
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> I have to assume that so many people require access to the specs that an interested party can surely acquire them.

Those documents are often secret or top secret, or even more compartmentalized.

There are training docs in wide use today that are not publicly findable on the internet, nor are they seemingly in the datasets of LLMs.

I'm sure there are reasons for that, of course.

What you're talking about would have an even higher level of obscurity and secrecy, and probably Compartmented Information access.

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Hat sounds like a particularly weak form of security by obscurity
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Layers of an onion and all that.

Often connectors are even proprietary.

(This is partially to protect systems not from the enemy, but from the troops themselves...)

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Also you do not want them to benefit from your smart design choices. You want them to suffer from their bad choices and not learn from your success. (Yes, of course you could have bad design choices that you don’t realize someone else has solved more intelligently.)
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Bad design choice is probably why they open sourced it.
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