A better fix is to take photos with all three iPhone cameras simultaneously, ideally as a 2-3s video, and use the parallax/multiple perspectives to extract depth information. The video files (Possibly audio too) could also be included with the verified image as additional verification.
They can also prevent photos if iPhone detects the LiDAR sensor is covered, similar to how Meta does it with their camera glasses.
I think optics could be used to make each camera see a different image.
A video could show shake, which could be verified against readings from the phone's accelerometer -- but you could just hold it still and claim that it was on a tripod.
I've never looked at the LiDAR hardware, but where is the emitter in relation to the receiver. Why would the LiDAR not reflect off of whatever you're blocking it with and return a very short flight meaning it was very close?
Similarly, LiDAR alone will help disqualify cases where someone is just taking a picture of e.g. a landscape target of the Golden Gate, but that it shown on a screen 1 meter away.
> increasing the difficulty of producing a forgery
The problem with this thinking is twofold:
1) Whether it actually meaningfully increases the difficulty of a forgery remains to be seen. Despite their initial language about discerning real events, we see no details here about what scene information is used.
2) It increases the potential value of a forgery because now your forgery is attested by Apple.
So it either makes it easier to defraud people or more worthwhile to put in the effort to defraud people or both. None of those outcomes are great.
[1] https://commonlands.com/products/ir-cut-filters-csp650?srslt...
But I really mean that if the lidar barely works outdoors anyway then actually you don't need to be 16 feet away at all.
Anyway, one may presume that they've thought about this.
It’s almost certainly possible to fool v1 of this system, for some images, in some contexts. It would be shocking if the first implementation was completely perfect. But maybe it’s better than nothing?
The problem is that it makes it easier to fool people and provide "cryptographic" evidence of validity, backed by big tech.
It's purpose is to stop bad actors from passing of fake as real just as much as it is to prevent real images being dismissed as fake.
Knowing Apple, they've been working on and testing Apple Reference Image for years.
It being perfect isn't the issue; it's that random people on the internet who are just learning about this assume Apple's engineers haven't already thought about everything (and more) mentioned in this thread.
Given how many bugs there are in macOS and how long they have remained there, I (who have been writing iOS apps from the release of the first retina iPod touch until AI got good) functionally agree with such people; at best, I think Apple's engineers haven't actually solved everything (and more) mentioned in this thread, even if every one of these things may have come up in discussions and even reached an official backlog or task list or similar.
I think this will depend on how it gets used. I can imagine numerous outcomes where it's in fact worse than nothing (significantly more effective blackmail, for instance).
While that is not quite my bar of confidence when implementing wide-reaching technologies that have numerous unexplored knock-on effects, I guess the calculus must have been different on Infinite Loop recently.
I’ve seen that type of argument a million times, and I’ll certainly reuse that.
seems pretty easy to make it sufficiently difficult to trick the system