upvote

points

by famouswaffles2 hours ago |
comments
upvoteby khalic2 hours ago|
[-]
You’re falling for the buzzword salad articles. They didn’t “take control” of anything, they just ran stuff with OpenAI allegedly not noticing
reply
upvoteby ndr1 hours ago|
parent|
next
[-]
From https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/67869394-cb91-4c12-888c-5cbd85c78...

2026-07-19 16:35 UTC A privileged host-mounted Kubernetes pod created using controller tokens minted via a compromised Kubernetes Secrets identity attempts, but fails, to mount a cloned node disk in OpenAI’s cloud environment. A second pod successfully mounts the cloned worker-node disk shortly afterwards.

2026-07-19 16:48 UTC An agent created an Artifactory administrator account.

2026-07-19 16:50 UTC Within OpenAI’s ExploitGym evaluation environment, an agent stopped the existing CMUX helper session and replaced it with an agent-controlled session, confirming root inside its assigned live CyberGym challenge container. Agents take over active evaluation infrastructure.

reply
upvoteby khalic1 hours ago|
parent|
[-]
None of that means they gained access to the inference infrastructure or locked out the admins, which would be required for a takeover.
reply
upvoteby Pragmata59 minutes ago|
parent|
[-]
My brother, they acquired root on a machine they should not have had access to.

How confident are you that the machines they acquire root on in the future will never hold any model weights?

reply
upvoteby khalic46 minutes ago|
parent|
[-]
I’m not saying it’s impossible, I’m saying it’s not the case, _yet_
reply
upvoteby famouswaffles2 hours ago|
parent|
prev|
[-]
They gained full administrator access of one of their clusters. Nothing buzzword salad about it.
reply
upvoteby khalic1 hours ago|
parent|
[-]
The agents compromised an internal Kubernetes research cluster dedicated to orchestrating evaluation sandboxes and virtual machine environments, _not_ OpenAI's production inference infrastructure or the GPU clusters hosting core model weights.
reply