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Well, definitely read Jason's blog entry that I linked to[0], which gets into the structural problems. To be clear, there were some extraordinary sales folks at Sun (as was said to me when I first came to Sun: "Remember that our sales folks are so good that they sold Solaris 2.3 on Viking!"), and I always personally got along very well with them. I was happy to be put in front of customers, and they were happy to use me -- and some of my fondest memories were with sales folks in some of the geographies which were particularly strong (shout out to Sun Canada, Sun Australia, and to the Wall Street and Itasca offices in the US).

So this isn't about the people at all (they will express the same frustration!) but about leadership that wasn't interested in running a business. I do want to stop short of overly personalizing it, but the simple truth is: Scott visited customers where they lived -- and Jonathan more or less didn't.

[0] https://fullhoffman.com/2006/03/20/the-sun-doesnt-shine-on-m...

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Ah, I love this framing of "visiting customers where they live." Definitely gets the bad taste of an eng-v-sales spat out of my mouth. Thanks for the details!
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I feel like Sun's main problem was that that era was pretty much the steepest part of the Intel S curve as far as chip performance goes, and it was outpacing the older chips on fab progress alone. I'm pretty sure had something like TSMC been around then at current strength, and Sun fabbed their excellent designs there, we'd have a mirror of what Apple is doing but in server space.
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> I probably don't have much incentive to pick up.

This is what Dell got right - for their sales team, this was an easy process - the product line was simple and easy to customise. Their sales reps wouldn't spend much time creating the proposals and could spend the remaining time building relationships with a lot more customers, some of which wouldn't fail.

> curious why sales didn't pick up the phone. Were they "bored?"

Unless you create incentives for bringing new customers, they'll leave the new names for last.

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I don't know what Sun's strategy was in the 2000s, but doing all of the R&D to develop exotic new hardware and then focusing the sales force on software seems like they're getting the worst of both worlds.
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Sure, I'm not saying that IBM's switch to services is some brilliant panacea for all proprietary hardware makers, just citing it as one of the market changes at the time that Sun seemed unprepared for.

What's interesting is that the other RISC outfit at the time, little old Acorn in the UK, did manage to adapt their proprietary chip business to the future of compute and now we all use many many ARM processors every day.

So clearly there was still a hardware route available, just again: a huge product/engineering shift.

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