Right, that’s basically what I’m saying. There’s not zero use for an attack like this, but it’s not a likely situation.
replySaid another way: if Artifactory was somehow a common gatekeeper between grounded techy teenagers and their access to internet porn, this would have been found ages ago.
> the lack of basic SysAdmin skills
replyIf we exclude those who lack "basic" level skills, what solution would most typically be used by someone who has "basic" level skills for this use case? And what solution for someone with "expert" (or medium) level skills?
Don’t let software inside the sandbox access the internet on request. Have a package repository with approved software the agents might want, and push to it over a channel that is ingress only. I can imagine ways of breaking out of this, and come up with a lot more to mitigate, but this would be fairly basic stuff that’d be vastly superior.
reply> ingress only
replyThe issue we're discussing happened while running ExploitGym. Doesn't the ExploitGym arXiv test explicitly have external "outbound" network requests as allowed for package installation and supporting toolchain installation?
Part of the toolchain had full internet access. Agents had access to Artifactory, Artifactory could do whatever it wanted. So even locking that down to certain external sites would have stopped this particular attack.
replyWell the most obvious thing would be to gate access to artifactory behind tools. E.g. apt get install is a tool and only the tool gets access to artifactory.
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